United States v. Hassoun
2007 WL 755272, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17508, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14, counts within a single indictment must be severed if a joint trial creates a serious risk of compromising a defendant's specific trial rights, such as when a legitimate defense strategy for one set of counts would cause undue prejudice to the defendant on another set of counts.
Facts:
- Adham Amin Hassoun and four co-defendants were allegedly involved in a collective effort to support and further violent jihad overseas.
- Hassoun allegedly encouraged, assisted, and provided financial support for an individual named Mohamed Hesham Youssef to travel to a foreign country for the purpose of fighting.
- During an immigration court proceeding, Hassoun gave testimony under oath regarding his relationship with and assistance to Youssef.
- Hassoun also made statements to FBI and Department of Homeland Security agents about his involvement with Youssef.
- Hassoun allegedly used coded language in conversations with Youssef, such as referring to weaponry as 'soccer equipment'.
- Hassoun also allegedly participated in conversations about a plan to kill a woman in Lebanon.
Procedural Posture:
- The U.S. government charged Adham Amin Hassoun and four co-defendants in a Fifth Superseding Indictment in the U.S. District Court.
- Counts 1-3 of the indictment charged all five defendants with conspiracy and providing material support to terrorists.
- Counts 5-11 (the 'falsity counts') charged only Hassoun with false statements, perjury, and obstruction of justice related to his testimony and statements about the activities in Counts 1-3.
- A separate firearm charge against Hassoun, Count 4, had already been severed.
- Defendant Hassoun filed a motion in the district court to dismiss Counts 5-11 for being legally defective.
- In the alternative, Hassoun filed a motion to sever Counts 5-11 from the primary conspiracy and material support counts, arguing a joint trial would be prejudicial.
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Issue:
Does the joinder of falsity counts (e.g., perjury and false statements) with substantive material support and conspiracy counts create a serious risk of prejudice to a defendant's right to a fair trial, requiring severance under Rule 14, when the defendant's planned defense to the falsity counts could be perceived by a jury as evidence of guilt on the substantive counts?
Opinions:
Majority - Cooke, District Judge
Yes, the joinder of the falsity and substantive counts creates a serious risk of prejudice that requires severance. A joint trial would unfairly force the defendant to choose between two constitutional rights: the right to present a complete defense to the falsity counts and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination on the material support counts. Hassoun intends to present a 'stonewalling' defense to the falsity charges, arguing his answers were literally true but evasive, a defense permitted under Bronston v. United States. However, presenting this defense would likely cause a jury to view him as deceptive and cunning, creating a 'prejudicial spillover' that would taint their consideration of the far more serious material support and conspiracy charges. Given the close subject-matter relationship between the two sets of counts, a curative jury instruction would be insufficient to mitigate the substantial risk of undue prejudice. Therefore, balancing the defendant's right to a fair trial against the interests of judicial economy, the scales tip decisively in favor of severance.
Analysis:
This order emphasizes that the principle of judicial economy, which favors joining related charges in a single trial, must yield to a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. The decision highlights a specific type of prejudice where a valid, legally recognized defense for one charge (a 'Bronston' or 'stonewalling' defense to perjury) directly undermines the presumption of innocence on another. This case serves as a key precedent for defense attorneys arguing for severance when trial strategies for different counts are in conflict, establishing that the potential for 'prejudicial spillover' can be grounds for separate trials even when the charges are factually related.
