United States v. Hassock
2011 WL 257446, 631 F.3d 79 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
A protective sweep is only permissible as a security measure incident to the pursuit of an otherwise legitimate police purpose; it cannot become the purpose itself for the officers' continued presence on the premises after their initial objective cannot be accomplished.
Facts:
- A confidential source informed ICE Agent Christopher Quinn that Eric Hassock, also known as 'Basil,' sold marijuana, possessed a black handgun, and lived in a specific basement apartment.
- An inter-agency task force conducted surveillance and learned that Hassock occupied the front bedroom of the apartment and had no known legal employment.
- On November 25, 2008, five task force members went to the apartment to conduct a 'knock and talk' and potentially arrest Hassock.
- After surveilling for an hour, officers knocked on the front and rear doors of the apartment.
- A woman, Shareel Coley, opened the rear door, telling officers she had just been woken up and did not know who else was in the apartment.
- When an officer asked if they could 'look around,' Coley said 'yes.'
- Without verifying Coley's identity or authority to consent, Agent Quinn and another officer immediately went to the front bedroom, which they believed to be Hassock's.
- Inside the bedroom, Quinn squatted down, looked under the bed, and discovered a Hi-Point .380 caliber pistol.
Procedural Posture:
- Eric Hassock was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for being a felon in possession of a firearm and for illegal reentry.
- Hassock filed a motion to suppress the firearm, arguing it was discovered during an illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
- The District Court held a suppression hearing, where Agent Quinn was the only witness.
- The District Court granted Hassock's motion to suppress, concluding that the protective sweep doctrine did not apply because the officers were not lawfully on the premises for a legitimate purpose when they conducted the sweep.
- The government, as the appellant, appealed the District Court's suppression order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the Fourth Amendment's protective sweep exception, which permits a limited warrantless search for officer safety, apply when police enter a home with questionable consent for a 'knock and talk,' fail to find the suspect they came to question, and then search the home for that suspect under the guise of a protective sweep?
Opinions:
Majority - Miner
No. The Fourth Amendment's protective sweep exception does not apply in this context because a protective sweep is a reasonable security measure only when it is incidental to an ongoing, legitimate police purpose. Here, the officers' legitimate purpose was to conduct a 'knock and talk' with Hassock. When Hassock did not answer the door, that purpose could not be pursued. The subsequent entry and search for Hassock was not a 'protective sweep' incident to another purpose, like an arrest or interrogation; rather, the search for Hassock became the primary purpose itself. The court distinguished this from Maryland v. Buie, where the sweep was incident to a lawful arrest inside the home. Because the search was not incident to any other lawful police conduct, it cannot be characterized as a protective sweep and was therefore an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the application of the protective sweep doctrine in the Second Circuit, especially in cases involving consent-based entries for investigative purposes like a 'knock and talk.' It establishes a clear limitation: the sweep must be truly protective and incidental to a separate, ongoing, and lawful police activity, not the primary mission itself. This ruling prevents law enforcement from bootstrapping a failed investigative encounter into a warrantless search under the guise of officer safety, reinforcing the principle that the protective sweep exception cannot be used as a pretext to circumvent the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
