United States v. Harriss et al.
347 U.S. 612 (1954)
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Rule of Law:
The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act is constitutional because its registration and disclosure requirements, when narrowly construed, apply only to persons or organizations that solicit, collect, or receive money for the principal purpose of influencing legislation through direct communication with members of Congress.
Facts:
- The National Farm Committee, a Texas corporation, solicited and received contributions to influence legislation concerning agricultural commodity prices.
- The Committee's goal was to secure the passage of legislation that would increase agricultural prices and defeat legislation that would cause a decline in those prices.
- Robert M. Harriss and Ralph W. Moore were charged with failing to report expenditures made for this purpose.
- These expenditures included payments to others for face-to-face communication with members of Congress and for committee hearing appearances.
- Additional expenditures funded a campaign to induce groups and individuals to communicate with members of Congress via letter on the same legislative issues.
- Moore and Tom Linder were hired for pay to attempt to influence legislation on agricultural prices.
- Pursuant to their employment, Moore and Linder arranged for members of Congress to be contacted directly by their emissaries or through an artificially stimulated letter campaign, without registering under the Act.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States government charged the appellees by information in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia with violating the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act.
- The District Court dismissed the information, ruling that the Act was unconstitutional.
- The United States, as the appellant, filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States under the Criminal Appeals Act.
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Issue:
Does the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for being unconstitutionally vague, and infringe upon the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech, press, and petition?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Warren
No, the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act does not violate the Constitution when its provisions are narrowly construed. To avoid constitutional infirmities of vagueness and overbreadth, the Act's coverage is limited to only those activities that fall within its core purpose. The Court held that the Act applies only to 'lobbying in its commonly accepted sense'—meaning direct communication with members of Congress on pending or proposed legislation. Therefore, the Act's requirements are triggered only when a person or group solicits, collects, or receives money for the 'principal purpose' of influencing legislation through such direct communications. This narrow construction provides fair notice of what conduct is proscribed, thus satisfying due process, and does not violate the First Amendment because it does not prohibit lobbying but merely requires disclosure, which is a permissible exercise of Congress's power of self-protection to maintain the integrity of the legislative process.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Douglas
Yes, the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act is unconstitutional. The Court's effort to save the statute by rewriting it is an inappropriate judicial function that cannot retroactively cure the statute's vagueness. The Act's plain language is so broad and indefinite, covering anyone who 'directly or indirectly' influences legislation, that 'men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.' This vagueness is particularly dangerous because it encroaches upon First Amendment freedoms, creating a chilling effect that deters individuals from exercising their rights of speech, press, and assembly for fear of prosecution. A criminal statute in the domain of the First Amendment must be narrowly drawn by Congress, not redrafted by the judiciary.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Jackson
Yes, the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act is unconstitutional. The Court has engaged in a radical judicial reconstruction, leaving 'an Act which is not much like any Act passed by Congress.' By deleting the term 'indirectly,' narrowing 'directly,' and expanding 'principal purpose,' the Court has usurped the legislative function. The criminality of the conduct depends entirely on a purpose to influence legislation, an area close to the First Amendment right to petition, which requires statutory precision. Leaving the statute's limitations to shifting judicial interpretation creates a 'contingent threat' to protected activities. The proper course would be to strike down the hopelessly vague Act and allow Congress, which understands the evils of lobbying, to draft a clear and constitutional replacement.
Analysis:
This case is a landmark example of the Supreme Court employing the canon of constitutional avoidance to save a federal statute from being struck down for vagueness. By narrowing the scope of the Federal Lobbying Act to cover only 'direct communication' with legislators by paid lobbyists, the Court preserved Congress's power to demand transparency in the legislative process. This decision established a durable legal distinction between direct lobbying, which is subject to regulation and disclosure, and indirect or grassroots advocacy aimed at the general public, which receives greater First Amendment protection. The ruling significantly shaped the future of lobbying regulation in the United States, creating a framework that focuses on disclosure from professional lobbyists rather than prohibiting broader advocacy efforts.
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