United States v. Harris
733 F.2d 994 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant's out-of-court statements offered to demonstrate their then-existing state of mind are not inadmissible hearsay. Such statements are either admissible as non-hearsay circumstantial evidence of the declarant's state of mind or fall under the Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) exception, and their admissibility does not depend on a trial court's preliminary assessment of their trustworthiness.
Facts:
- Mahlon Steward, a narcotics dealer, agreed to work as an undercover informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
- Steward contacted his acquaintance, George Harris, in an effort to arrange a purchase of heroin.
- In New York City, DEA agents observed Harris meet with two men in a car registered to the wife of Angelo Mamone.
- Following this meeting, Harris told Steward that he had met with his "New York connection" but that there were problems.
- Over several months, Steward engaged in numerous recorded phone calls with Harris, pressuring him to arrange a heroin transaction.
- On May 6, 1982, following instructions from Harris, Steward met a man in Brooklyn whom he later identified as Mamone.
- Mamone asked Steward if he had "the package" ($40,000) and directed Steward to meet him at the Sheraton Center, but Mamone never appeared.
- The next day, Harris called Steward and chastised him for not following the plan, which was to hand over the money without negotiation.
Procedural Posture:
- George Harris and Angelo Mamone were charged in a superseding indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York with conspiracy to distribute heroin and attempting to possess heroin with intent to distribute.
- At trial, the district judge excluded proffered testimony from Harris's parole officer and attorney regarding statements Harris made to them about being 'set up'.
- A jury found both Harris and Mamone guilty on both the conspiracy and attempt counts.
- Harris and Mamone, the appellants, appealed their convictions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the Federal Rules of Evidence bar the admission of a defendant's out-of-court statements to his parole officer and attorney when offered to prove his then-existing state of mind (his belief that he was being set up by a government informant)?
Opinions:
Majority - Pratt, J.
No. A defendant's out-of-court statements are admissible to show their then-existing state of mind, and the district court erred by excluding such testimony as hearsay. The court reasoned that the proffered testimony of Harris's parole officer and attorney about Harris's statements—that he believed the government was trying to "set him up"—was not inadmissible hearsay. Depending on their exact phrasing, the statements were either admissible non-hearsay offered as circumstantial evidence of Harris's knowledge and beliefs, or they were admissible under the Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) exception for statements of a declarant's then-existing state of mind. The court explicitly rejected the government's argument that admissibility under this exception requires a preliminary judicial finding of trustworthiness, stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence operate by defining categorical exceptions, leaving the assessment of credibility to the jury. Because this erroneous exclusion precluded Harris's sole defense, it was not harmless error and required reversing the conspiracy convictions for both Harris and Mamone.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle that the state-of-mind hearsay exception under Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) is a categorical rule, not a discretionary standard. It curtails a trial judge's ability to exclude otherwise admissible state-of-mind evidence based on a subjective assessment of its credibility or the declarant's motive to fabricate. This strengthens a defendant's ability to introduce evidence supporting defenses like duress or lack of intent, even if the statements are self-serving. The ruling preserves the jury's role as the ultimate arbiter of fact and credibility, preventing judicial encroachment on that function.
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