United States v. Harold Dorman
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 11159, 2017 WL 2697979, 860 F3d 675 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
Constructive possession of contraband in a jointly occupied home requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of and was in a position to exercise dominion and control over the contraband, with additional evidence beyond mere residence, especially if the contraband is not in plain view.
Facts:
- On October 22, 2013, a robbery occurred at a Kay Jewelers store in Maryland, where two diamond rings were taken from a sales clerk.
- The robber was captured on video entering a white Dodge Charger, which was a rental car loaned to Harold Dorman's father.
- Harold Dorman was seen exiting the Dodge Charger at a 7-11 convenience store in Maryland two days after the robbery.
- FBI agents tracked the Dodge Charger via GPS and located it parked near 2317 Chester Street, S.E., Washington, D.C., which public records listed as Dorman's address and his mother described as his 'home base'.
- Law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at 2317 Chester Street, S.E., a home Dorman frequented.
- Inside the home, officers found a Glock 9-millimeter handgun hidden under a couch cushion in the first-floor living room, a one-ounce vial of PCP in or behind a vase in the living room, and a 15.2 ounce Tropicana juice bottle filled with PCP on the floor of the basement laundry room.
- In the basement bedroom, which Dorman's mother had 'fixed up' for him and where he was the sole occupant, officers found a loaded Ruger 9-millimeter pistol wedged between the mattress and box spring, along with men's clothing, sneakers, Dorman's judicial court papers, and a painting of him playing football.
- Dorman's mother testified that he called her during the search, and after she told him the police were 'all over my house' and she was 'upset and yelling,' Dorman responded, 'Ma, I'm sorry.'
Procedural Posture:
- Harold Dorman was indicted on three counts in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia: Count 1 (unlawful possession with intent to distribute 100g+ PCP), Count 2 (unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon), and Count 3 (using a firearm during a drug trafficking offense).
- The district court denied Dorman's motion to suppress the items seized during the search.
- At trial, a jury found Dorman guilty as charged on all three counts.
- The district court denied Dorman's motions for acquittal and a new trial.
- The district court sentenced Dorman to concurrent terms of seventy months’ imprisonment on Counts 1 and 2, and a consecutive term of sixty months’ imprisonment on Count 3, plus thirty-six months’ supervised release.
- Dorman, as appellant, appealed his convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, with the United States of America as appellee.
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Issue:
Does the government meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Harold A. Dorman constructively possessed PCP seized from the laundry room of his mother’s home, where multiple individuals had access and the PCP was not in plain view?
Opinions:
Majority - Rogers, Circuit Judge
No, the government did not meet its burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Harold A. Dorman constructively possessed the PCP seized from the laundry room of his mother's home. However, yes, it did for the gun found in his bedroom. For the PCP (Counts 1 and 3), the court reverses the convictions. Constructive possession requires proof that the defendant knew of and was in a position to exercise dominion and control over the contraband. For shared spaces, additional evidence linking the defendant to the contraband is needed, especially if not in plain view. Here, the PCP in both the laundry room (Tropicana bottle) and living room (vial in/behind vase) was not in plain view. Dorman was not physically present during the search. While Dorman constructively possessed a gun in his bedroom, this alone, given the spatial separation, cannot establish constructive possession of PCP in a separate common area, stretching the 'drugs and guns go together' theory beyond its common usage, which would be 'piling inference upon inference.' Many individuals had access to the common areas of the home, and there was no tangible evidence (fingerprints, DNA) directly connecting Dorman to the PCP. Dorman's 'I'm sorry' statement to his mother was ambiguous and could have related to his recent robbery arrest, not necessarily the drugs. The evidence was equivocal and insufficient, leaving a jury to mere speculation, which is not permitted for a conviction. For the gun in the basement bedroom (Count 2), the court affirms the conviction. The evidence established Dorman as the sole occupant of the basement bedroom, even with some shared use by his mother for storage. He exercised dominion and control over the bed where the gun was found, as his personal papers and effects were next to it, and he was home the night before the search. This narrowed the window for someone else to stash the gun undetected. This falls under the established precedent for constructive possession where the defendant is the sole occupant of a room where contraband is found, and the gun was visible to its occupant and easily accessible.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the evidentiary standard for proving constructive possession, particularly when contraband is found in shared residences. It reiterates that mere residency, even if frequent, is insufficient, and stresses the need for specific 'plus factors' beyond attenuated connections. The ruling restricts the broad application of the 'drugs and guns go together' inference, emphasizing that physical proximity is crucial for this connection to support a constructive possession finding. This decision protects individuals from being unduly charged based on tenuous links to contraband in communal spaces, ensuring that prosecutors must present compelling, direct evidence of a defendant's knowledge and control.
