United States v. Harmon
88 Fed. R. Serv. 446, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67260, 871 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (2012)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause, as interpreted by Brady v. Maryland, does not require the prosecution to disclose impeachment evidence to a defendant before a suppression hearing or the entry of a guilty plea. This obligation to disclose impeachment evidence is tied to ensuring the fairness of a trial, not pre-trial proceedings.
Facts:
- In an unrelated case, New Mexico Department of Public Safety Officer Hermilo Lucero conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle driven by John Sheridan.
- Lucero initially characterized the stop as a 'welfare check' because Sheridan's vehicle appeared to be lost or was parked in an unusual manner on a frontage road.
- During the stop, Sheridan provided what Lucero considered suspicious and implausible travel plans, stating he had flown to San Francisco for a short trip and was now driving back to Albuquerque because his girlfriend was sick and could not care for their rare birds.
- After Sheridan gave questionable answers, Lucero's drug-sniffing dog alerted to the presence of narcotics in Sheridan's vehicle.
- Following the dog's alert, Lucero radioed his dispatcher and instructed them, 'don’t put in the CA[D], but this is a — a whisper stop from DEA.'
- A 'whisper stop' is a law enforcement tactic where an agency like the DEA confidentially informs a patrol officer about a vehicle suspected of carrying contraband, and the officer must then independently develop a legal basis for a traffic stop.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury returned an indictment charging Defendant Michael Harmon with possession with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana.
- Harmon filed a Motion to Suppress evidence discovered during a traffic stop conducted by Officer Lucero, arguing the stop and search were illegal.
- The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico held a hearing and issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Harmon's Motion to Suppress.
- Harmon entered into a plea agreement, pleading guilty to the cocaine charge while reserving his right to appeal the court's denial of his suppression motion.
- After pleading guilty but before sentencing, Harmon learned of Officer Lucero's conduct in an unrelated case, United States v. Sheridan, which he believed constituted impeachment evidence.
- Based on this newly discovered evidence, Harmon filed a Motion to Reconsider the denial of the suppression motion, a Motion to Withdraw Plea, and a Supplemental Motion to Withdraw Plea and to Re-Open Suppression Proceeding, which are now before the court.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause require the prosecution to disclose impeachment evidence concerning a government witness to a defendant before a suppression hearing or the entry of a guilty plea?
Opinions:
Majority - James Browning
No, the Due Process Clause does not require the prosecution to disclose impeachment evidence before a suppression hearing or the entry of a guilty plea. The court first determined that the newly discovered evidence from the separate 'Sheridan' case—specifically Officer Lucero's instruction to keep a 'whisper stop' off the official dispatch log—did not constitute valuable impeachment evidence. The court found that a 'whisper stop' is a legitimate law enforcement technique and that Officer Lucero's request to maintain confidentiality was a reasonable measure to protect an ongoing DEA investigation, not an act of dishonesty. Therefore, the evidence lacked impeachment value and was not 'material' under Brady v. Maryland, meaning its disclosure would not have created a reasonable probability of a different outcome in the suppression hearing. More broadly, the court held that even if the evidence had impeachment value, the prosecution had no constitutional duty to disclose it before the suppression hearing or guilty plea. Extending the logic of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Ruiz, which held that pre-guilty plea disclosure of impeachment information is not required, the court reasoned that this principle also applies to suppression hearings. The court explained that impeachment evidence is 'special in relation to the fairness of a trial, not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary' or whether evidence should be suppressed. Because Harmon's suppression ruling was sound and there was no Brady violation, he failed to show a 'fair and just reason' to withdraw his guilty plea.
Analysis:
This opinion extends the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Ruiz, which limited the government's pre-plea disclosure duties for impeachment evidence, to the context of pre-trial suppression hearings. The decision reinforces the principle that the constitutional right to impeachment material under Brady v. Maryland attaches primarily to the trial itself, where guilt or innocence is adjudicated. By finding no disclosure obligation before a suppression hearing, the court narrows the grounds upon which defendants can challenge suppression rulings or seek to withdraw guilty pleas based on later-discovered evidence about a witness's credibility. This strengthens the finality of pre-trial dispositions and protects law enforcement investigative techniques, such as 'whisper stops,' from premature disclosure.
