United States v. Haney
2002 WL 652253, 287 F.3d 1266, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7364 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
The affirmative defense of duress is available to a defendant who commits a criminal act to protect a third person from an immediate threat of death or serious bodily harm, regardless of whether the defendant and the third person share a familial relationship.
Facts:
- Tony S. Francis, a federal inmate and friend of fellow inmate Robert M. Haney, was incorrectly identified on the television show 'America's Most Wanted' as a leader of the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang.
- This false identification placed Francis in danger from both African-American inmates and actual Aryan Brotherhood members within the Florence, Colorado federal penitentiary.
- Following a ten-day prison lockdown due to racial tensions, three African-American inmates threatened Francis, indicating that a race war was imminent and he was a target.
- Francis believed that seeking help from prison authorities would label him a 'snitch,' placing him in even greater danger, and concluded that his only option was to escape.
- Haney agreed to help his friend Francis, using his position in the prison laundry to gather escape paraphernalia.
- Approximately two weeks after the initial threat, Francis was shown a note confirming he was still considered a target, reinforcing their plan.
- On the night of the planned escape, Haney and Francis hid in the prison yard with the collected items.
- Haney then persuaded Francis that a better plan was to get caught attempting to escape, thereby being placed in disciplinary segregation without having to report the threats. They scattered the paraphernalia and were subsequently caught by prison guards.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States charged Robert Haney and Tony Francis in federal district court with possession of escape paraphernalia and attempted escape.
- At their joint trial, the district court judge instructed the jury on the defense of duress for Francis but refused to give the same instruction for Haney.
- The jury convicted Haney of possession of escape paraphernalia but acquitted him of attempted escape.
- The jury also acquitted Francis of attempted escape, expressly finding he had acted under duress.
- Haney appealed his conviction for possession of escape paraphernalia to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing the trial court erred by not allowing him to present a duress defense to the jury.
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Issue:
Does the affirmative defense of duress extend to a defendant who commits a crime to protect an unrelated third person from a credible and immediate threat of serious harm when there is no other reasonable opportunity to avert the harm?
Opinions:
Majority - Henry, Circuit Judge
Yes, the affirmative defense of duress extends to a defendant who acts to protect an unrelated third person. Limiting the duress defense to situations where the defendant or a family member is threatened is unprincipled, arbitrary, and unjust. The rationale for the defense—that social welfare is maximized by forgiving a minor offense to avoid a greater harm—applies equally regardless of the relationship between the defendant and the person threatened. The court reasoned that the Model Penal Code and legal commentators support extending the defense to any third person. Furthermore, creating a 'family relationship' test would be unworkable and difficult to apply consistently. The court also found that Haney presented sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably conclude that the threat to Francis was immediate and that neither man had a reasonable legal alternative to avert the harm, such as reporting the threats to prison guards, which they testified would have put Francis in more danger.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies and expands the scope of the duress defense within the Tenth Circuit. By explicitly rejecting a 'familial relationship' requirement, the court adopts a modern, utilitarian view of the defense, focusing on the justification of avoiding a greater harm rather than on the status of the parties involved. This precedent establishes that the defense is available to those who act to protect friends, colleagues, or even strangers. The ruling reinforces the principle that it is the jury's role to weigh the credibility of evidence regarding the elements of duress, such as the immediacy of a threat and the reasonableness of alternatives, especially within the complex social dynamics of a prison environment.
