United States v. Hale
422 U.S. 171 (1975)
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Rule of Law:
Under the federal rules of evidence, a defendant's silence following arrest and Miranda warnings is insolubly ambiguous and its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial impact. Therefore, it is prejudicial error for a prosecutor to use that silence to impeach the defendant's credibility at trial.
Facts:
- Lonnie Arrington reported to police that he had been robbed by a group of five men.
- While searching the neighborhood with police, Arrington identified respondent Hale as one of the assailants.
- When police approached, Hale fled but was quickly captured.
- Hale was arrested, taken to the police station, and advised of his right to remain silent.
- Police found $158 in cash on Hale and asked him where he got the money.
- In response to the officer's question about the money, Hale remained silent.
- At trial, Hale testified that he was at a narcotics treatment center at the time of the robbery.
- Hale further testified that the money came from his estranged wife, who had given it to him to purchase money orders.
Procedural Posture:
- Hale was tried for robbery in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, a trial court.
- During the trial, the prosecutor cross-examined Hale about his post-arrest silence, and the judge denied a motion for a mistrial.
- A jury convicted Hale of robbery.
- Hale, as appellant, appealed the conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Court of Appeals reversed Hale's conviction, holding that the inquiry into his silence was impermissible.
- The United States, as petitioner, was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Court of Appeals' decision.
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Issue:
Does using a defendant's silence during police interrogation, after that defendant has received Miranda warnings, to impeach their trial testimony constitute prejudicial error?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Marshall
Yes. It was prejudicial error for the trial court to permit cross-examination of the respondent concerning his silence during police interrogation. A defendant's silence after receiving Miranda warnings is insolubly ambiguous and lacks significant probative value because it could be an exercise of the right to remain silent rather than an admission of guilt or fabrication. The court reasoned that an arrestee's silence in the face of accusation is not necessarily inconsistent with a later exculpatory story, as the situation is inherently coercive and the person has just been told they have a right to be silent. Applying the factors from Grunewald v. United States, the court found Hale's silence was not inconsistent with his later testimony because of the intimidating, secretive nature of custodial interrogation and his clear status as a suspect. The court concluded that the minimal probative value of this silence was 'outweighed by the prejudicial impact' of allowing a jury to draw a negative inference from it.
Concurring - Chief Justice Burger
Yes. While concurring in the judgment, this opinion criticizes the majority's reliance on the 'fallacy' from Grunewald that innocent people are more likely to remain silent in secret proceedings. The author argues there is no empirical data to support this generalization about human behavior and that the formality of open court could be just as intimidating as a police station for some individuals. The concurrence agrees with the result but objects to elevating a 'casual generalization' into a legal principle.
Concurring - Justice Douglas
Yes. This opinion agrees with the judgment but would base the decision on constitutional grounds, not the specific circumstances of the case or evidentiary rules. The author believes that Miranda v. Arizona should be given full effect, and that using a person's exercise of a constitutional privilege (the right to remain silent) to discredit or convict them is inherently unconstitutional. This opinion also states that using a defendant's silence at the time of arrest violates due process.
Concurring - Justice White
Yes. This opinion argues that when the government informs a person under arrest of their right to remain silent, it violates due process to then use that silence against them at trial. The Miranda warnings create an implicit assurance that silence will carry no penalty. Allowing the prosecution to suggest that silence implies guilt would be a fundamentally unfair 'bait and switch,' as the defendant was not warned that silence, in addition to words, could be used against him.
Analysis:
This case establishes, under the Supreme Court's supervisory power over federal courts, that a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence cannot be used for impeachment purposes. While the majority deliberately avoided a constitutional ruling, its reasoning and the concurring opinions laid the groundwork for a future constitutional holding. This decision significantly strengthens the protections afforded by Miranda warnings, preventing prosecutors from turning the exercise of the right to remain silent into a weapon against the defendant. The case would later be extended to state courts on due process grounds in Doyle v. Ohio, which adopted the reasoning articulated in Justice White's concurrence.
