United States v. Gustin
2011 WL 2184330, 642 F.3d 573, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11452 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
A district court does not commit error, let alone plain error, by permitting a criminal defendant's counsel to omit an entrapment defense, as the choice of defense strategy belongs to the defendant and their counsel, and judicial interference is improper.
Facts:
- Scott Gustin, a member of the Nuestra Familia prison gang, was an inmate at a federal prison in Pekin, Illinois.
- The victim was a member of the Sureños, a rival gang with whom Nuestra Familia had a hostile relationship.
- The constitution of Nuestra Familia allegedly required its members to kill members of the Sureños on sight.
- The prison's policy was to scatter gang members throughout the general population rather than segregate them by gang affiliation.
- Before prison guards assigned the victim to a cell with Gustin, they asked Gustin if the assignment would create a problem.
- Gustin assured the guards that the assignment was acceptable and pledged to remain peaceable.
- Following the cell assignment, Gustin and a confederate stabbed and wounded the victim in a common area of the prison.
Procedural Posture:
- Scott Gustin was charged with attempted murder in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois.
- At his trial, Gustin’s defense was that he was misidentified and did not commit the stabbing.
- A jury in the trial court found Gustin guilty of attempted murder.
- The district court judge sentenced Gustin to life in prison.
- Gustin, with new appellate counsel, appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a district court commit plain error by failing to sua sponte raise an entrapment defense or instruct the jury on it when the defendant did not raise the defense and instead pursued a contrary trial strategy of denying involvement in the crime?
Opinions:
Majority - Easterbrook, Chief Judge
No. A district court does not commit plain error by permitting defense counsel to omit an entrapment defense. A criminal defendant has a right to choose their line of defense in consultation with counsel, and a judge must not interfere with that strategic decision. Judicial inquiry into defense strategy could disrupt the attorney-client relationship and improperly reveal privileged information to the prosecution. Furthermore, raising an entrapment defense mid-trial would be highly disruptive and would allow the prosecutor to introduce damaging evidence of the defendant's character and prior criminal history to prove predisposition, a risk no defendant would want a judge to invite spontaneously. On the merits, an entrapment defense would have failed because Gustin's claim that his gang rules compelled him to attack his rival is an admission of predisposition, which is fatal to an entrapment defense. A defendant who willingly commits a crime when an opportunity arises cannot shift the blame to others, including government officials, for creating that opportunity.
Analysis:
This decision strongly reinforces the principle of defendant autonomy in criminal defense strategy and establishes a bright-line rule that judges are not to act as secondary defense counsel. It clarifies that a judge's failure to intervene in strategic choices, such as omitting a potential defense, cannot be grounds for appeal based on judicial error. The ruling effectively places the responsibility for such decisions squarely on defense counsel, channeling any challenges into claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which are typically handled on collateral review. This protects the finality of trials and prevents defendants from using appellate review to second-guess trial strategies that proved unsuccessful.
