United States v. Guillermo Vallejo

Majority - Wardlaw, Circuit Judge

Yes, a district court abuses its discretion by allowing irrelevant expert testimony on drug trafficking organizations when the defendant is not charged with conspiracy; by excluding defense expert testimony explaining a defendant's communication difficulties; by excluding relevant evidence of third-party culpability; and by providing misleading jury instructions regarding the mens rea of a drug importation offense. The court held that expert testimony concerning the general structure and operations of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 because it was irrelevant. Vallejo was not charged with conspiracy, and no evidence established a connection between him and a DTO. The government failed to articulate the testimony's relevance to Vallejo’s specific case. Even if intended to show knowledge, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403, as it unfairly imputed knowledge to Vallejo by linking his conduct to a vast drug empire, similar to how inadmissible drug courier profiles operate. Agent Garcia’s testimony on courier payment rates was similarly inadmissible because it was 'inextricably intertwined' with the improper DTO context. The district court also abused its discretion by excluding the expert testimony of Vallejo's high school psychologist. This testimony was admissible under Rule 702 as it addressed an issue beyond common knowledge—the communication problems of former special education students in high-pressure situations—and would have assisted the jury in understanding discrepancies between Vallejo’s and Agent Pina’s recollections of the interrogation. The expert was qualified and his opinion reliable, based on extensive review of Vallejo's ten years of school records, and Rule 703 permits expert opinions not based on firsthand knowledge. Under Rule 403, the testimony was highly probative for rehabilitating Vallejo on the key issue of knowledge and was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Furthermore, the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of third-party culpability related to Jose Jaramillo, the car's former owner. This evidence was relevant under Rule 401 because it presented an 'alternative theory' of how the drugs were secreted in the car without Vallejo's knowledge, given that Jaramillo had been arrested one month prior to Vallejo under strikingly similar circumstances (same port, similar drug quantity, similar concealment). The timing of Jaramillo's arrest and the subsequent transfer of the car out of his name further bolstered its relevance. Under Rule 403, the evidence’s high probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; it simply supported Vallejo’s defense. Finally, the district court abused its discretion in its jury instructions regarding mens rea. The statutes under which Vallejo was charged require proof of knowledge, not mere suspicion. The court first misstated the standard as 'knew or suspected' and then issued a 'curative' instruction stating the parties 'stipulated' to 'knew' as the standard. This 'stipulated' language was erroneous and misleading because the requirement of knowledge is a matter of law, not agreement. This error was particularly critical as knowledge was the sole issue in dispute, and the 'stipulation' could have led the jury to infer an unusually strong case for the government or to still believe suspicion was sufficient, rendering the error not harmless.