United States v. Groves
2008 WL 2550745, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 13560, 530 F.3d 506 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
A warrantless search of a shared residence based on the voluntary consent of a co-occupant with common authority is valid against an absent co-occupant, even if the absent co-occupant had previously refused consent, so long as the police did not procure the objecting co-occupant's absence.
Facts:
- On July 5, 2004, police responded to a report of gunshots near Daniel Groves' apartment.
- When questioned, Groves admitted to living at the address but denied having a gun, stating he was shooting off fireworks.
- Groves vigorously and unequivocally denied the officers' request for permission to search his apartment.
- After officers found spent shotgun shells on the ground, they reiterated their request to search, and Groves again refused consent.
- On July 21, 2004, police officers went to Groves' apartment at a time they knew he was scheduled to be at work.
- Groves' girlfriend, Shaunta Foster, who also occupied the apartment, answered the door.
- Foster signed a consent form permitting the officers to search the apartment.
- During the search, officers recovered five .22 caliber bullets from a drawer in Groves' nightstand.
Procedural Posture:
- Daniel Groves was charged in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.
- Groves filed a Motion to Suppress the ammunition, arguing the search was illegal, which the district court denied.
- Following a trial, a jury convicted Groves on both counts.
- Groves appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- In the first appeal (Groves I), the Seventh Circuit reversed the firearm conviction and remanded the suppression issue to the district court for further factual findings.
- On remand, the district court held another hearing and again denied Groves' Motion to Suppress.
- Groves (appellant) then filed a second appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, challenging the denial of his motion, with the United States as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit a warrantless search of a shared dwelling based on the consent of a present co-occupant when another co-occupant, who is absent at the time of the search, had previously and expressly refused to consent?
Opinions:
Majority - Rovner, Circuit Judge
No. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a warrantless search of a shared dwelling based on the consent of a present co-occupant when an absent co-occupant had previously refused consent. The court found that Foster possessed actual authority to consent to the search of the apartment, as she had a key, received mail, kept personal belongings there, and had unlimited access. This authority extended to an unlocked, unmarked nightstand in a shared bedroom. The court distinguished this case from Georgia v. Randolph, which requires an objecting co-tenant to be physically present to invalidate another's consent. Although police waited until Groves was at work, they did not actively procure his absence to avoid an objection. Therefore, Groves' prior refusal, made weeks earlier while he was present, did not create a continuing bar to Foster's valid consent given in his absence.
Analysis:
This decision narrowly interprets and limits the Supreme Court's holding in Georgia v. Randolph. It clarifies that the 'physically present' requirement for a co-tenant's objection to be effective is a bright-line rule. The ruling establishes that a prior refusal to consent does not have a lingering effect that invalidates a subsequent consent by another co-occupant once the objecting party is no longer present. This provides law enforcement with a clear, albeit controversial, method for gaining entry to a shared residence after an initial refusal by one occupant, simply by waiting for that individual to leave and then seeking consent from another.
