United States v. Grimaud
220 U.S. 506, 1911 U.S. LEXIS 1695, 31 S. Ct. 480 (1911)
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Rule of Law:
Congress does not unconstitutionally delegate its legislative power when it authorizes an executive branch official to make administrative rules to implement a statute and makes the violation of those rules a criminal offense, provided that Congress itself defines the crime and prescribes the penalty.
Facts:
- Congress passed the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, which authorized the creation of national forest reserves.
- A subsequent act in 1897 granted the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to make rules and regulations to manage the occupancy and use of these reserves to protect the forests.
- The Secretary of Agriculture promulgated regulations, including one that required a permit to graze livestock, such as sheep, on the Sierra Forest Reserve.
- Pierre Grimaud and J.P. Carajous drove and grazed their sheep on the Sierra Forest Reserve.
- Grimaud and Carajous did so without having obtained the required permit from the Secretary of Agriculture.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States indicted the defendants in federal court for grazing sheep on a forest reserve without a permit, in violation of regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture.
- The defendants demurred to the indictment, arguing that the Forest Reserve Act unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the Secretary.
- The trial court sustained the demurrers, finding the statute invalid and dismissing the case.
- The United States government filed a writ of error, bringing the case directly to the United States Supreme Court pursuant to the Criminal Appeals Act.
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Issue:
Does the Forest Reserve Act of 1891 unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the Secretary of Agriculture by authorizing him to make rules and regulations for the use of forest reserves, the violation of which is made a penal offense by the statute?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Lamar
No, the Forest Reserve Act does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Congress may lawfully authorize executive officers to 'fill up the details' of a statute by making administrative rules and may make the violation of those rules a punishable offense. The court reasoned that it is impracticable for Congress to provide general regulations for the various and varying details of forest management. By authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to create rules tailored to local conditions, Congress was merely conferring administrative functions, not delegating its core legislative power to make law. A critical distinction is that the Secretary does not create the crime or fix the penalty; Congress did so in the statute itself by stating that any violation of 'such rules and regulations shall be punished.' The regulations are administrative, while the substantive legislation defining the crime and punishment comes from Congress. This approach is distinct from cases like United States v. Eaton, where Congress had failed to explicitly make the violation of the administrative regulations a punishable offense.
Analysis:
This case is a landmark decision in administrative law, solidifying the nondelegation doctrine's practical application. It affirmed the authority of Congress to delegate rulemaking power to executive agencies, a crucial foundation for the modern regulatory state. The decision established the principle that as long as Congress provides an 'intelligible principle' or general policy, it can task an agency with 'filling up the details' through regulation. By clarifying that Congress retains its legislative power by defining the crime and setting the penalty, the Court paved the way for numerous federal agencies to enforce complex statutory schemes through detailed, expert-driven rulemaking.
