United States v. Gray
2015 WL 1088796, 780 F.3d 458, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3958 (2015)
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Rule of Law:
For a conviction under 49 U.S.C. § 46507(1) for conveying false information about a bomb threat, the statutory element of "maliciously" requires the government to prove that the defendant acted with an "evil purpose or motive," not merely an "improper motive."
Facts:
- Nancy Gray was an American Airlines flight attendant scheduled to work Flight 1318 from Boston to Miami on September 30, 2009.
- A cabin service crew member, John Marino, cleaned the aircraft's lavatories, including the middle lavatory, and observed nothing written inside the paper towel dispenser's storage door.
- Shortly after, Marino saw Gray enter and then exit the same middle lavatory.
- Gray then reported to the lead flight attendant that she had discovered a note reading "Bomb on Board! BOS-MIA" written on the inside of that storage door.
- The discovery led to the flight being stopped, the aircraft evacuated, and a multi-hour search that found no bomb.
- On December 23, 2009, during an interview with the FBI that she had requested, Gray wrote and signed a confession.
- In her confession, Gray admitted to writing "Bomb on board!" and stated her motivation was to "get the ground workers in trouble."
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury indicted Nancy Gray for giving false information regarding a bomb threat in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 46507(1).
- Gray pleaded not guilty in the U.S. District Court, the trial court of first instance.
- Gray filed a motion to suppress her confession, which she later withdrew before trial.
- Following a trial, a jury found Gray guilty of the charged offense.
- The district court sentenced Gray to twenty-seven months in prison.
- Gray, as the appellant, appealed her conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, challenging, among other things, the jury instructions.
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Issue:
Does a jury instruction defining the statutory element of 'malice' as acting with an 'evil purpose or an improper motive' impermissibly lower the government's burden of proof in a prosecution under 49 U.S.C. § 46507(1)?
Opinions:
Majority - Thompson, J.
Yes, a jury instruction defining malice as acting with an 'evil purpose or an improper motive' impermissibly lowers the government's burden of proof. The court held that the correct definition of 'maliciously' under 49 U.S.C. § 46507(1) is 'to do something with an evil purpose or motive.' The court reasoned that Congress intended a higher standard of culpability for the felony offense compared to the lesser civil penalty for merely knowingly providing false information. Adopting a common law definition like 'intentionally' would create statutory redundancy. The court followed the Fourth Circuit's analysis in United States v. Hassouneh, which examined the legislative history of a nearly identical statute and concluded that Congress equated 'maliciously' with an 'evil or reckless motive' to distinguish serious felons from mere 'pranksters.' The district court's addition of 'or improper motive' diluted this standard, as 'improper' is a far broader and less culpable concept than 'evil.' This error was not harmless because the evidence of Gray's motive was debatable, and the jury could have convicted her based on the lower, incorrect standard.
Dissenting - Howard, J.
No, the jury instruction did not impermissibly lower the government's burden of proof. The dissent argued that the majority used an incomplete definition of common law malice. The settled common law definition of malice is not merely 'intentional' but requires committing a wrongful act 'without justification, excuse, or mitigation.' The district court's instruction, including 'improper motive,' adequately conveyed this concept, as an improper motive is one that lacks justification or excuse. Under this correct common law definition, there is no redundancy in the statute; 'willfully' requires an intentional act, while 'maliciously' adds the element that the act was without just cause. Therefore, there was no need to depart from the common law meaning or consult legislative history, and the district court’s instruction was proper.
Analysis:
This case establishes the controlling definition of 'malice' for the crime of making a false bomb threat under 49 U.S.C. § 46507(1) within the First Circuit, creating a split with circuits that favor a more general common law definition. By adopting the 'evil purpose or motive' standard, the court significantly raises the government's burden of proof, requiring prosecutors to demonstrate a defendant's specific nefarious intent beyond merely acting intentionally and without justification. The decision underscores the critical importance of precise language in jury instructions, illustrating how a single word like 'improper' can constitute reversible error by lowering the required mens rea for a serious felony.
