United States v. Gouveia et al.
467 U.S. 180 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings, not when a suspect is placed in administrative detention or segregation during a pre-indictment investigation.
Facts:
- On November 11, 1978, inmate Thomas Trejo was murdered at a federal prison in Lompoc, California.
- Prison officials suspected William Gouveia, Robert Ramirez, Adolpho Reynoso, and Philip Segura, and placed them in the Administrative Detention Unit (ADU).
- After disciplinary hearings, prison officials determined these four inmates had participated in the murder and ordered their continued confinement in the ADU.
- These four inmates remained in the ADU, separated from the general population, for approximately 19 months without appointed counsel.
- On August 22, 1979, another inmate, Thomas Hall, was murdered at the same prison.
- Officials suspected inmates Robert Mills and Richard Pierce of Hall's murder and immediately placed them in the ADU.
- Following a disciplinary hearing, Mills and Pierce were also ordered to remain in the ADU.
- Mills and Pierce remained in the ADU for approximately eight months without appointed counsel before being formally charged.
Procedural Posture:
- Respondents Gouveia, Ramirez, Reynoso, and Segura were indicted for murder in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.
- Their pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel was denied, and they were subsequently convicted.
- Respondents Mills and Pierce were separately indicted for murder in the same court.
- Their pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on the same Sixth Amendment grounds was granted by the District Court.
- A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal for Mills and Pierce, who were then convicted at trial.
- All six respondents appealed their convictions to the Ninth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, consolidated the appeals, reversed all convictions, and ordered the indictments dismissed, holding that the inmates' Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated.
- The United States (petitioner) successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attach for prison inmates who are placed in administrative detention for an extended period due to a pending criminal investigation, before any formal charges, indictment, or arraignment have occurred?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rehnquist
No. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings. The right is not triggered by a pre-indictment investigation, even if the suspect is confined in administrative segregation. The court's precedents have consistently held that the right to counsel begins only with formal proceedings such as a formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. It is at that point that the government has committed to prosecution and the defendant is faced with the intricacies of the law. Concerns about pre-indictment delay and potential prejudice to a defense are protected by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and statutes of limitations, not the Sixth Amendment's counsel guarantee. The purpose of the right to counsel is to provide aid at critical trial-type confrontations with the state, not to furnish a preindictment investigator.
Concurrence - Justice Stevens
No. While I agree that the respondents' Sixth Amendment rights were not violated, the majority's rule that the right attaches only after formal judicial proceedings is overly broad and inconsistent with precedents like Escobedo v. Illinois. The right to counsel should attach when a person is deprived of liberty for an 'accusatorial function'—that is, to aid the prosecution in its attempt to convict him. In this case, however, the respondents' detention in the ADU served a legitimate institutional security purpose, to protect other inmates and staff, rather than an accusatorial one. Because the detention was not at the behest of prosecutors or intended to facilitate the criminal investigation, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not triggered.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
Yes. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel should have attached because the government had effectively transformed the respondents into 'accused' individuals before any formal charges were filed. The lower courts found that the long-term commitment to administrative detention was not merely for prison security but was 'part and parcel of a sequence of prosecutive acts.' This lengthy pre-indictment confinement, intended to aid the future prosecution while isolating the suspects, constituted an accusation that triggers the right to counsel. The resulting delay caused substantial prejudice to the respondents' ability to prepare a defense, justifying the dismissal of their indictments.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a bright-line rule for when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, tying it exclusively to the formal initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. By rejecting the idea that pre-indictment administrative detention can trigger the right, the Court clearly separates the counsel guarantee from other constitutional protections like the right to a speedy trial or due process, which can apply earlier. This ruling provides law enforcement and prosecutors with significant leeway to conduct extended pre-indictment investigations without the requirement of providing counsel to suspects, even those in custody. For future cases, it shifts the legal battleground for pre-indictment delay from the Sixth Amendment to the more difficult-to-prove standard of a Fifth Amendment due process violation.
