United States v. Gould
536 F.2d 216 (1976)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Federal Rule of Evidence 201(g), which requires a judge to instruct a criminal jury that it may, but is not required to, accept a judicially noticed fact, applies only to adjudicative facts (facts of the particular case) and not to legislative facts (general facts used to interpret a statute).
Facts:
- Charles Gould, Joseph Carey, and David Miller planned to import cocaine from Colombia, South America, into the United States.
- They enlisted Miller’s sister, Barbara Ken-worthy, to act as a courier.
- In May 1975, Gould, Carey, and Ken-worthy traveled to Colombia where cocaine was purchased.
- The cocaine was packed into two pairs of hollowed-out platform shoes for Ken-worthy to wear.
- Upon Ken-worthy's arrival at the Miami airport, a customs agent x-rayed her shoes, discovering approximately two pounds of cocaine.
- After being interrogated by DEA agents, Ken-worthy agreed to cooperate with authorities.
- She participated in a controlled delivery of a cocaine substitute to Miller in Des Moines, Iowa, which led to his arrest.
Procedural Posture:
- Charles Gould and Joseph Carey were charged with conspiracy to import and importation of cocaine in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
- A jury found Gould and Carey guilty on both counts.
- Gould and Carey, as appellants, appealed their convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
In a criminal prosecution, does a trial court err by taking judicial notice of a legislative fact and instructing the jury that it must accept that fact as conclusive, contrary to the permissive instruction required for adjudicative facts under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(g)?
Opinions:
Majority - Gibson, Chief Judge.
No, a trial court does not err by instructing a jury that it must accept a judicially noticed legislative fact. The requirement in Federal Rule of Evidence 201(g) for a permissive jury instruction applies only to adjudicative facts, not legislative facts. Adjudicative facts are those concerning the immediate parties and their actions ('who did what, where, when'), which are for the jury to decide. Legislative facts, in contrast, are general truths or propositions that a court uses to interpret a statute or formulate a legal principle. The fact that cocaine hydrochloride is a derivative of coca leaves and thus a schedule II controlled substance is a legislative fact because it is a matter of scientific truth used to interpret the Controlled Substances Act, not a fact specific to the defendants' activities. Therefore, the district court was correct to instruct the jury that if they found the substance was cocaine hydrochloride, they must accept that it is a schedule II controlled substance, as this ensures uniform application of the law and avoids absurd results where juries could make conflicting findings on settled scientific facts.
Analysis:
This case establishes a crucial boundary for the application of Federal Rule of Evidence 201(g) concerning judicial notice in criminal cases. By distinguishing between adjudicative and legislative facts, the court preserves the judge's authority to interpret the law, which often relies on noticing general, undisputed facts. This decision prevents defendants from arguing that juries have the right to nullify the scientific or historical underpinnings of a statute. The ruling solidifies the principle that while a jury decides the facts of the case, the judge determines the content of the law, and judicially noticed legislative facts are part of the law's content.
