United States v. Goodwin
457 U.S. 368 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
A presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness does not apply when a prosecutor brings more serious charges against a defendant in the pretrial context after the defendant has invoked a procedural right, such as the right to a jury trial. To prove a due process violation in a pretrial setting, the defendant must show objective evidence of actual vindictiveness.
Facts:
- Respondent Goodwin was stopped for speeding by a United States Park Policeman.
- The officer noticed a clear plastic bag under the armrest in Goodwin's car.
- When asked to raise the armrest, Goodwin put the car in gear, accelerated rapidly, struck the officer, and knocked him onto the highway.
- Goodwin then eluded the officer in a high-speed chase.
- Goodwin was arrested but fled the jurisdiction for three years before being apprehended and returned to Maryland.
- Upon his return, Goodwin initiated plea negotiations with a prosecutor assigned to handle misdemeanor cases.
- Goodwin later terminated plea negotiations and requested a trial by jury on the pending misdemeanor charges.
Procedural Posture:
- An officer filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court charging Goodwin with misdemeanor and petty offenses, to be tried before a magistrate.
- After Goodwin requested a jury trial, his case was transferred for trial in the District Court and assigned to an Assistant U.S. Attorney.
- The prosecutor obtained a new indictment charging Goodwin with one felony count and three related counts.
- A jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland convicted Goodwin on the felony count.
- Goodwin moved to set aside the verdict on grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness; the District Court denied the motion.
- Goodwin, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that a presumption of vindictiveness applied and had not been rebutted.
- The United States, as petitioner, sought and was granted a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness arise, in violation of the Due Process Clause, when a prosecutor files more serious charges against a defendant who, during pretrial proceedings, has declined to plead guilty and has invoked their right to a jury trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
No. A presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness does not arise when a prosecutor brings more serious charges against a defendant before trial after the defendant invokes the right to a jury trial. The Due Process Clause is not violated by all possibilities of increased punishment, but only by those that pose a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness. Unlike the post-conviction setting of North Carolina v. Pearce and Blackledge v. Perry, where an institutional bias against retrying decided issues creates a likelihood of vindictiveness, a prosecutor's charging decision in a pretrial setting has often not yet crystallized. A prosecutor should remain free before trial to re-evaluate the evidence and the societal interest in prosecution, and the invocation of routine procedural rights, like demanding a jury trial, is an expected part of the adversary process, unlikely to provoke a retaliatory response. A defendant retains the ability to prove actual vindictiveness through objective evidence, but a presumption is not warranted.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. The elevation of charges from misdemeanors to a felony after a defendant invokes his constitutional right to a jury trial poses a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness and thus violates the Due Process Clause. This case is controlled by Blackledge v. Perry, as the defendant's demand for a jury trial significantly increases the prosecutor's workload and creates an incentive to discourage such elections by 'upping the ante.' The fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter defendants from exercising their rights. This situation is not a 'give-and-take' plea negotiation as in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, but rather a 'unilateral imposition of a penalty' for the exercise of a legal right.
Concurring - Justice Blackmun
No, but for different reasons. While a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness does arise when a prosecutor increases charges after a defendant elects a jury trial, such a presumption is rebuttable. A prosecutor can overcome the presumption by presenting objective information that justifies the increased charges, such as evidence that was not reasonably available at the time of the initial charges or identifiable conduct by the defendant after the original charging decision. In this case, the prosecutor provided an adequate objective explanation for the felony indictment, thereby dispelling the appearance of vindictiveness and satisfying the requirements of due process.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the application of the prosecutorial vindictiveness doctrine established in Pearce and Blackledge. By creating a bright-line distinction between pretrial and post-trial conduct, the Court grants prosecutors greater discretion in their charging decisions before a trial has commenced. This ruling shifts the burden to defendants in pretrial situations, requiring them to prove actual vindictiveness rather than relying on a presumption based on the timing of the charges. The case effectively insulates many initial charging adjustments from due process challenges, reinforcing the fluid nature of prosecutorial decision-making during the case-development phase.
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