United States v. Gloria Ann Morales
97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1637, 46 Fed. R. Serv. 1145, 108 F.3d 1031 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) does not preclude an expert from testifying about a predicate matter from which a jury might infer the defendant's required mental state, so long as the expert's opinion does not state an ultimate conclusion about the defendant's mens rea or necessarily compel such a conclusion.
Facts:
- From 1988 to 1991, Gloria Ann Morales worked as the exclusive bookkeeper for Local 304 of the Laborers’ International Union.
- Morales's bookkeeping practice involved recording an amount received in the 'Amount' column and simultaneously entering a matching figure in the 'Deposits' column, even if she had not actually made the deposit yet.
- She would make the actual bank deposit at a later time using future receipts when sufficient funds became available to match the previously entered figure.
- Morales testified she had never completed high school, had no formal training in bookkeeping or accounting, and received very limited training for her role.
- In 1991, Morales informed her supervisor, Julian Vega, that money was missing from the union's funds.
- A subsequent audit revealed that approximately $36,000 was missing, and Morales could not produce deposit slips or funds for all the 'deposits' she had recorded.
Procedural Posture:
- Gloria Ann Morales was charged in U.S. District Court with one felony count of embezzlement and two misdemeanor counts of willfully making false entries in union records.
- At her jury trial, the government presented testimony that Morales had a strong grasp of bookkeeping.
- Morales proffered expert testimony from a certified public accountant, Hilary Crosby, to testify that Morales had a weak grasp of bookkeeping principles.
- The district court sustained the government’s objection and excluded Crosby's testimony.
- The jury acquitted Morales of the embezzlement charge but convicted her of the two misdemeanor counts of willfully making false entries.
- Morales was sentenced to a three-year term of probation.
- Morales, as the appellant, appealed her conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing the district court erred in excluding the expert testimony.
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Issue:
Does Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) preclude an expert from testifying about a defendant's weak grasp of bookkeeping principles, where such testimony is offered to support an inference that the defendant lacked the 'willful' intent required for the crime of making false entries?
Opinions:
Majority - Thompson, J.
No. Rule 704(b) does not preclude expert testimony on a predicate matter from which a jury could, but is not compelled to, infer the defendant's mental state. The proffered testimony from the accountant expert, Hilary Crosby, concerned Morales's level of understanding of bookkeeping principles, not the ultimate issue of whether she willfully made false entries. A jury could believe Morales had a weak grasp of bookkeeping but still find she knowingly made the false entries; therefore, the testimony does not state an opinion on the ultimate issue of mens rea. The court also held that Rule 704(b) applies to all expert witnesses, not just psychiatrists or mental health experts. In reaching this conclusion, the court explicitly overruled its prior decision in United States v. Brodie, which had held that Rule 704(b) precluded expert testimony from which a jury might 'extrapolate' the defendant's mens rea.
Analysis:
This case clarifies and narrows the scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b)'s prohibition on expert testimony regarding a defendant's mental state. By overruling United States v. Brodie, the court rejected an expansive reading of the rule, establishing that experts can testify about foundational facts, skills, or conditions of a defendant, even if that testimony directly supports an inference about the ultimate issue of intent. This decision allows defense attorneys to introduce a wider range of expert testimony to explain a defendant's actions without having the expert directly opine on the ultimate issue reserved for the jury. It creates a clearer line between permissible testimony on predicate matters and impermissible testimony on the ultimate legal conclusion of mens rea.
