United States v. Gilliland
586 F.2d 1384 (1978)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The prosecution may not use cross-examination to convert a defense fact witness into a character witness solely to create a pretext for introducing otherwise inadmissible evidence of a defendant's remote prior convictions. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b), evidence of convictions more than 10 years old is inadmissible for impeachment unless its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect and the proponent provides advance written notice.
Facts:
- Roy Valentine Gilliland was stopped by law enforcement near Guymon, Oklahoma, while driving a vehicle.
- The vehicle had been stolen a few hours earlier from Dumas, Texas.
- Gilliland claimed he did not steal the car but had bought it on approval from a purported salesman in a bar in Oklahoma.
- Gilliland asserted that part of the payment was the cancellation of a gambling debt the salesman owed him.
- Gilliland's stepson, Billy Tull, was present during the alleged transaction and observed some of the paperwork being exchanged.
Procedural Posture:
- Roy Valentine Gilliland was charged in federal district court with transportation of a stolen automobile across state lines.
- A jury trial was held.
- The jury found Gilliland guilty of the charged offense.
- Gilliland, as the appellant, appealed the conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a prosecutor's cross-examination of a defense fact witness, which elicits testimony about the defendant's good character and is then immediately rebutted with evidence of the defendant's remote prior convictions, violate the Federal Rules of Evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - Logan, Circuit Judge
Yes. The prosecutor's cross-examination improperly introduced prejudicial evidence of the defendant's prior convictions in violation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The government may not convert a fact witness into a character witness through its own questioning and then use that testimony to 'bootstrap' into the case otherwise inadmissible evidence of a defendant's prior criminal record. First, Billy Tull was an eyewitness, not a character witness, so the defense had not opened the door to character evidence under Rule 404(a)(1). Second, the prior convictions, ranging from 14 to 34 years old, were too remote to be admissible to show intent or plan under Rule 404(b). Third, the convictions did not meet the strict requirements for admission for impeachment under Rule 609(b), as they were over ten years old, no advance written notice was given, and the trial court failed to find that their probative value substantially outweighed their prejudicial effect. The introduction of this evidence was not harmless error and necessitates a new trial.
Analysis:
This decision strongly reinforces the evidentiary rule against using a defendant's prior crimes as proof of conformity with that character. It serves as a crucial check on prosecutorial tactics by explicitly forbidding the 'bootstrapping' of inadmissible evidence by turning a fact witness into a character witness on cross-examination. The ruling solidifies the high bar set by Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b) for admitting remote convictions, emphasizing that such evidence is presumptively prejudicial and inadmissible without a specific judicial finding and proper notice. This case illustrates how appellate courts may use the 'plain error' doctrine to reverse a conviction based on a serious evidentiary mistake that undermines the fairness of a trial, even if the defense did not properly object.
