United States v. Gildardo Navarro-Diaz
2005 WL 1982127, 420 F.3d 581, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 17509 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant’s identity is not suppressible as a 'fruit of an unlawful arrest' under the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, even if obtained during an allegedly unlawful detention, unless the violation is an egregious transgression of fundamental fairness.
Facts:
- In January 2003, police in Xenia, Ohio, were called to a Holiday Inn to investigate reports of a strong marijuana odor emanating from a guest room.
- The hotel manager informed police that the room was occupied by two African-American males, and three Hispanic males, including Gildardo Navarro-Diaz, had joined them.
- After a five-minute delay, Leroy Swindle, one of the African-American males, opened the door, admitted to smoking marijuana, and provided officers with a small bag of marijuana, which was flushed.
- When officers asked all five men to identify themselves, Navarro-Diaz provided a false name, Jose Perez, and a false date of birth, which did not match police database records.
- Navarro-Diaz insisted his name was Jose Perez but provided a different false date of birth when asked a second time, which also did not match any known person in the police database.
- As officers were taking Navarro-Diaz and his two Hispanic companions to the police station, an officer noticed Juan Candelez, one of the companions, fidgeting and found a handgun magazine and a loaded handgun on him.
- A subsequent search of the hotel room revealed a second handgun rolled up in a towel in the bathroom.
- Officers later found a wallet in Candelez's car that contained an identification card for a man resembling Navarro-Diaz, prompting Navarro-Diaz to finally admit his true name was Gildardo Navarro-Diaz.
Procedural Posture:
- Gildardo Navarro-Diaz was arrested by police after being found in a hotel room with several other men who were armed and in possession of marijuana.
- Navarro-Diaz was charged in a one-count indictment with being an alien who had previously been deported and was present in the United States without permission, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
- Navarro-Diaz moved to suppress the evidence of his identity and date of birth in the district court, arguing it was obtained through an unlawful detention in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
- The district court denied Navarro-Diaz’s motion to suppress, concluding that INS v. Lopez-Mendoza precluded the suppression of identity regardless of whether he had been unlawfully detained.
- Navarro-Diaz then entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
- The district court sentenced Navarro-Diaz to 57 months imprisonment, applying a 16-level enhancement based upon his prior felony drug convictions.
- Navarro-Diaz filed a timely appeal to the Sixth Circuit, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress his identity and committed plain error in enhancing his sentence.
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Issue:
1. Does the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule require the suppression of a defendant's identity when it is disclosed as a result of an allegedly unconstitutional police detention in a criminal prosecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1326? 2. Did the district court commit plain error in sentencing Navarro-Diaz under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, warranting a remand for resentencing?
Opinions:
Majority - Gilman, Circuit Judge
No, a defendant's identity is not suppressible under the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, even if obtained during an allegedly unlawful detention, unless the violation is an egregious transgression of fundamental fairness. The court relied on the Supreme Court's holding in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza that 'the “body” or identity of a defendant... in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest.' This principle was reinforced by United States v. Crews, which held that while the exclusionary sanction applies to 'fruits' of a constitutional violation, a defendant 'is not himself a suppressible 'fruit.'' The court distinguished the suppression of identity (name, date of birth) from physical evidence like fingerprints, which previous Supreme Court cases have found suppressible. The Sixth Circuit observed that suppressing identity in a prosecution for illegal re-entry (8 U.S.C. § 1326) creates a practical problem because the defendant's 'unregistered presence in this country, without more, constitutes a crime,' meaning their release would immediately subject them to criminal penalties again. Furthermore, the court found that Navarro-Diaz was not the victim of an 'egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment,' as his encounter was not a random attempt to determine if he was an illegal alien, but rather precipitated by his presence in a room with a marijuana odor, false identification, and later, discovery of weapons among his companions. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress his identity. Yes, the district court committed plain error in sentencing Navarro-Diaz under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. While United States v. Booker clarified that the Sixth Amendment's bar against mandatory enhancements based on judicial fact-finding does not apply to the fact of a prior criminal conviction, Booker also rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory, not mandatory. The court held that a defendant sentenced under the mandatory Guidelines regime is entitled to a remand for resentencing under the now-advisory Guidelines unless there is evidence to rebut the presumption of prejudice. Here, the record contained affirmative evidence suggesting the district court might have imposed a shorter sentence if it had possessed the discretion to do so (e.g., noting that deportation made sentences harsher for aliens).
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the doctrine that a defendant's identity is generally not subject to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, even when discovered through an unlawful detention. It clarifies the application of Lopez-Mendoza and Crews in the context of criminal prosecutions for illegal re-entry, distinguishing identity from physical evidence. The 'egregious violation' exception to this rule remains a high bar, suggesting that only extreme police misconduct, beyond a mere lack of reasonable suspicion, would warrant identity suppression. This stance limits the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule in such cases, prioritizing the government's ability to prosecute ongoing crimes like unlawful presence. The decision also applies the immediate aftermath of United States v. Booker, mandating resentencing for defendants sentenced under the former mandatory guidelines regime, even if the Sixth Amendment aspect (judicial fact-finding for enhancements) is not directly at issue for prior convictions.
