United States v. George L. Goins
2006 WL 302245, 437 F.3d 644, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 3118 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
A warrantless search based on third-party consent is valid under the Fourth Amendment if police officers have a reasonable belief that the consenting party possesses authority over the premises. Evidence discovered during an unconstitutional part of an otherwise valid search is admissible if it would have been inevitably discovered through lawful means.
Facts:
- After an argument with her boyfriend, George Goins, Kalina Bratton called the police, claiming he had assaulted her.
- Bratton asked for a police escort to Goins' apartment to retrieve her belongings, stating she had been living there 'on-and-off' for months, possessed a key, and did household chores there.
- Bratton admitted to police that she had her own separate apartment several miles away where she lived with her children.
- Bratton informed police that Goins, whom she believed to be a convicted felon, kept crack cocaine and a handgun in a black case under the couch in his apartment.
- At the apartment, Bratton used her key to unlock the door and let the officers inside.
- During a search of the apartment, officers found some of Bratton's belongings, but observed no other women's clothing in closets and no mail addressed to her.
- An officer located a gun case under the couch, opened it, and found a handgun inside.
- Another officer found a bag of crack cocaine in the pocket of a man's jacket hanging in a closet.
Procedural Posture:
- George Goins was charged in U.S. District Court with possession of cocaine base and being a felon in possession of a firearm.
- Goins filed a motion to suppress the drugs and the gun, arguing the search of his apartment violated the Fourth Amendment.
- A magistrate judge held a hearing and recommended that the district court deny the motion to suppress.
- The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and denied Goins's motion.
- Goins, the appellant, appealed the district court's denial of his suppression motion to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a warrantless search of a suspect's apartment violate the Fourth Amendment when police obtain consent from the suspect's girlfriend, who possesses a key and detailed knowledge of the apartment but also maintains a separate primary residence?
Opinions:
Majority - Flaum, Chief Judge
No, the warrantless search does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The search was justified by the doctrine of apparent authority, and the gun found inside the case was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The officers reasonably believed that Bratton had the authority to consent to the search of the apartment. This belief was based on objective facts, including her possession of a key, her detailed knowledge of the apartment's interior and where contraband was located, the presence of her personal belongings, and her consistent statements that she stayed there regularly and had free rein of the house. Although some facts suggested she had another residence, they were not sufficient to make the officers' belief unreasonable. Regarding the gun case, while opening it without a warrant was unconstitutional, the gun itself is admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The officers had probable cause to believe the case contained a gun belonging to a known felon, and thus they could have seized the case and would have inevitably obtained a warrant to open it.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the 'apparent authority' doctrine established in Illinois v. Rodriguez, clarifying that police may rely on a third party's consent even when faced with some ambiguous or conflicting facts about their authority. It grants law enforcement significant latitude in assessing a cohabitant's authority to consent, focusing on the reasonableness of the police's belief at the moment of the search rather than the individual's true legal status. Furthermore, the case serves as a practical application of the inevitable discovery doctrine, demonstrating how it can cure a specific Fourth Amendment violation (opening the case) that occurs during a broader, lawful search, preventing the suppression of critical evidence.
