United States v. Gamalier Concepcion
942 F.2d 1170 (1991)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
While inserting a key into a lock to obtain information constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, it is a minimally intrusive search that is reasonable without a warrant or probable cause because the privacy interest in the information revealed is so small.
Facts:
- After agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) arrested Gamalier Concepcion, they seized his possessions, including his keys.
- The agents located a nearby apartment building with the nameplate “Concepcion” on the mailbox.
- Using one of Concepcion's keys, the agents opened the outer door of the building and entered the common hallway.
- While in the common area, an agent inserted the key into the lock of apartment 1C.
- The key turned the lock, and agents opened the door about an inch before immediately closing and locking it without looking inside.
- Agents then told Concepcion that his key opened the apartment and that his name was on the mailbox.
- Following this exchange, Concepcion signed a form consenting to a search of apartment 1C.
- A subsequent search of the apartment revealed cocaine.
Procedural Posture:
- Gamalier Concepcion was charged in federal district court with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
- Concepcion filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that his consent to search was tainted by a prior illegal search (the key insertion).
- The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the motion to suppress.
- Concepcion entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right to appeal the district court's denial of his suppression motion.
- Concepcion, as appellant, appealed the ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a law enforcement officer's insertion of a key into an apartment door lock, for the sole purpose of identifying it as belonging to the key's owner, constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Easterbrook, Circuit Judge
No. The insertion of a key into a lock does not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that while the act is technically a 'search' because it reveals private information (the connection between the key and the lock), the expectation of privacy in a keyhole is exceptionally minimal. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches, and the reasonableness of a search depends on the degree of intrusion. Here, the information obtained—the suspect's address—was not a secret and could have been ascertained through multiple other lawful means. Because the privacy interest is so small and the intrusion so slight, neither a warrant nor probable cause is required for the search to be considered reasonable.
Analysis:
This case is significant for its nuanced approach to the definition of a 'search' and the requirement of 'reasonableness.' It establishes that not all warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, creating a category of minimally intrusive searches that are constitutionally permissible without probable cause. The decision reinforces a balancing test, weighing the degree of privacy invasion against the government's interest, suggesting that the less intrusive the search, the less justification is required from law enforcement. This provides a framework for analyzing new technology and investigative techniques that might constitute technical 'searches' but do not deeply invade traditional privacy interests.
