United States v. Frederick Praetorius
622 F.2d 1054 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
Due process does not compel the government to grant statutory use immunity to a defense witness unless extraordinary circumstances exist. Testimony sought merely to impeach the credibility of a government witness on a collateral matter does not constitute such an extraordinary circumstance.
Facts:
- In 1976, Charles Praetorius and Ralph Abruzzo organized a conspiracy to import heroin from Thailand into the United States.
- The conspiracy involved multiple trips to Bangkok, where members would purchase heroin and smuggle it back by taping it to their bodies or concealing it in luggage.
- Appellant Carlotta Ragan financed a trip in March 1977 and allegedly helped smuggle heroin.
- Appellant Vincent Auletta served as a courier on a trip in September 1977.
- Appellant Frederick Praetorius, brother of the organizer, participated in an August 1977 trip and helped supervise a December 1977 operation.
- Appellants William Burley, Michael Lanza, Kenneth Lebel, and Gail Harris were recruited as couriers for the large-scale December 1977 operation.
- Two key participants in the conspiracy, Ralph Abruzzo and Glenston Page Laws, became the government's principal witnesses against the appellants.
Procedural Posture:
- The seven appellants were charged with conspiracy to import heroin and other narcotics violations in the U.S. District Court.
- The first trial resulted in a hung jury on most counts.
- At a second trial, all seven appellants were tried together and convicted by a jury.
- The appellants appealed their convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's due process right require a district court to compel the government to grant statutory use immunity to a defense witness whose proffered testimony would only serve to impeach the credibility of a government witness on a collateral matter?
Opinions:
Majority - Kelleher, District Judge
No, a defendant's due process right does not require the government to grant statutory use immunity to a defense witness under these circumstances. The court held that the government is ordinarily not required to grant immunity to defense witnesses, except in rare and exceptional cases. While the Second Circuit has left open the possibility that 'extraordinary circumstances' might require immunity to satisfy due process, such circumstances were not present here. The defense sought to compel immunity for witness Kathy Sargent, whose testimony was offered by appellant Lebel. However, the purpose of her testimony was not to provide material, exculpatory evidence directly related to Lebel, but rather to attack the credibility of government witness Laws by highlighting inconsistencies in his recollection of collateral details. The court concluded that testimony relating merely to the credibility of another witness is a collateral matter and does not rise to the level of an 'extraordinary circumstance' that would compel the government to grant immunity.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the high threshold defendants in the Second Circuit must meet to compel the government to grant immunity to a defense witness. By defining 'extraordinary circumstances' narrowly, the court preserves substantial prosecutorial discretion in choosing who receives immunity. The ruling clarifies that the defendant's right to present a defense does not typically override the government's strategic prosecutorial decisions, especially when the desired testimony is not directly exculpatory but is instead aimed at impeaching a government witness on a collateral issue. This makes it significantly more difficult for defendants to call witnesses who might otherwise invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
