United States v. Freddie Taylor
2003 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2494, 322 F.3d 1209, 2003 Daily Journal DAR 3122 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
An individual convicted as a principal in an offense, including as an aider and abettor, cannot also be convicted as an accessory after the fact for the same underlying conduct, because participation in the escape phase of a crime is part of the commission of the principal offense.
Facts:
- Alzinnia Keyes was a federal confidential informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), assisting in an investigation of Terile Williams for cocaine trafficking.
- Williams was arrested and in federal custody, and Keyes was scheduled to be a witness against him at his trial.
- Freddie Taylor and Michael Waggoner were friends with Williams.
- Waggoner told Williams's sister to tell Williams "not to worry, because [I am] going to get the bitch," referring to Keyes.
- A week later, Taylor drove Waggoner to the location where Keyes was present.
- Eyewitnesses observed Waggoner shooting Keyes.
- Taylor then drove Waggoner away from the scene of the crime.
- Before dying, Keyes told a paramedic that "Terile's people did this."
Procedural Posture:
- Freddie Taylor was tried in the U.S. District Court.
- A jury convicted Taylor of conspiracy to murder, aiding and abetting murder, witness tampering, and accessory after the fact.
- At sentencing, the district court judge expressed concern about the validity of the accessory conviction but did not set it aside, instead imposing a concurrent sentence.
- Taylor appealed his convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's participation in the escape phase of a crime, which makes him liable as a principal for aiding and abetting, also support a separate conviction for being an accessory after the fact to the same offense?
Opinions:
Majority - Beezer, Senior Circuit Judge
No. A defendant's participation in the escape phase of a crime, which makes him liable as a principal, cannot also support a separate conviction as an accessory after the fact. The court reasoned that there is a critical distinction between a principal (or aider and abettor) who participates in the commission of a crime and an accessory after the fact who assists the offender only after the crime is complete. Citing its precedent in United States v. Dinkane, the court affirmed that the escape or "get-away" phase is part of the commission of the underlying crime. Taylor's act of driving the getaway car made him an aider and abettor, and thus punishable as a principal under 18 U.S.C. § 2. The accessory after the fact statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3, applies to a person who assists an "offender," not to the offender himself. To hold otherwise would lead to the "absurd result" of allowing every principal to be charged as an accessory for failing to turn themselves in, which contradicts the distinct statutory punishments for principals and accessories.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the legal distinction between liability as a principal and as an accessory after the fact. It establishes that actions comprising the 'escape phase' of a crime are legally considered part of the principal offense, making the actor an aider and abettor. This holding prevents prosecutors from impermissibly 'stacking' charges by convicting a defendant as both a principal and an accessory for the same continuous course of conduct. The case thus provides a clear boundary for future cases, ensuring that the accessory after the fact charge is reserved for individuals who provide aid only after the commission of the primary offense is complete.
