United States v. Frank Gary Buckner
2007 WL 64268, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 544, 473 F.3d 551 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
A warrantless search of password-protected computer files is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if police obtain consent from a third party who, based on the totality of the circumstances, they reasonably believe has authority to consent, even if that third party lacks actual authority over the specific protected files.
Facts:
- Police in Grottoes, Virginia, began investigating online fraud committed through AOL and eBay accounts opened in the name of Michelle Buckner.
- Michelle Buckner told officers she had a home computer leased in her name that she shared with her husband, Frank Buckner.
- She stated that she only used the computer occasionally to play solitaire.
- The computer was located in the living room of the Buckner residence.
- When officers visited the home while Frank Buckner was not present, Michelle Buckner gave them broad oral consent "to take whatever [they] needed."
- Based on her consent, officers seized the computer.
- Frank Buckner was the only person who knew the password required to access his personal files on the computer.
- The police officers were not aware of the password protection at the time of the seizure or during the subsequent forensic search.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury indicted Frank Buckner on twenty counts of wire fraud and twelve counts of mail fraud.
- In the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia (the trial court), Buckner filed a motion to suppress the evidence found on the computer.
- The district court denied the motion to suppress.
- Buckner entered a conditional plea of guilty, which reserved his right to appeal the court's denial of his suppression motion.
- Buckner (appellant) appealed the district court's ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, with the United States (appellee) responding.
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Issue:
Does a warrantless search of a defendant's password-protected computer files violate the Fourth Amendment when the police reasonably believe a third party, who provides consent, has common authority over the computer, even if that third party lacks actual authority over the specific files?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Motz
No, the warrantless search does not violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers acted under a reasonable belief that the consenting third party had authority. While a third party without knowledge of a password lacks actual authority to consent to a search of password-protected files, the search is constitutional under the doctrine of apparent authority. The court determined that Michelle Buckner lacked actual authority over her husband's files because, by using a password, he affirmatively intended to exclude others, similar to placing items in a locked box within a common area, as established in United States v. Trulock. However, the search was justified by apparent authority, as defined in Illinois v. Rodriguez. The officers' belief that Michelle's consent was valid for the entire computer was objectively reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances, which included: the computer was in a common living area, it was leased solely in Michelle’s name, the investigation centered on fraudulent accounts opened in her name, and the officers had no information indicating any files were password-protected.
Analysis:
This decision extends the Fourth Amendment doctrine of apparent authority into the digital realm, specifically concerning password-protected files on a shared computer. The ruling clarifies that the 'locked box' analogy from physical searches applies, but the 'lock' (i.e., the password protection) must be apparent to officers for a co-user's consent to be deemed unreasonable. This places a burden on the defendant to show that officers knew or should have known about the exclusive control over the digital space. The case signals that unless officers are put on notice of private, password-protected areas, they may reasonably rely on a co-inhabitant's general consent to search a shared device.
