United States v. Francisco Martin Duran
96 F.3d 1495, 321 U.S. App. D.C. 47, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 26365 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant can be convicted of attempting to commit a crime if they have the requisite criminal intent and take a substantial step in furtherance of that crime, even if circumstances, such as mistaken identity of the victim, prevent the crime's completion.
Facts:
- In mid-September 1994, Francisco Martin Duran began purchasing assault weapons, ammunition, and a folding stock for a rifle in Colorado.
- On September 30, Duran left his job and family without notice and began traveling to Washington, D.C.
- During his trip, he purchased another ammunition clip in Virginia and a large overcoat capable of concealing his rifle.
- On October 29, 1994, Duran stood on the sidewalk in front of the White House wearing the overcoat.
- Two students nearby pointed at a civilian, Dennis Basso, who strongly resembled President Clinton, and commented on the resemblance.
- Almost immediately after hearing the students' comments, Duran pulled an assault rifle from under his coat and fired at least twenty-nine rounds across the North Lawn in the direction of Basso.
- After firing, Duran ran along the fence while continuing to shoot, and was tackled by a civilian as he appeared to be reloading.
- A search of Duran's truck and home uncovered items such as a road atlas on which he had written “Kill the Pres!”, a defaced picture of President Clinton, and a document titled “Last will and words.”
Procedural Posture:
- Francisco Martin Duran was tried in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
- Prior to trial, Duran filed a motion to bifurcate the trial to present his merits and insanity defenses separately, which the district court denied.
- On April 4, 1995, a jury convicted Duran on ten criminal counts, including attempted assassination of the President and assault on federal officers.
- Duran, as the appellant, appealed his convictions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing against the United States, the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a defendant commit the crime of attempting to assassinate the President under 18 U.S.C. § 1751(c) by taking numerous substantial steps toward that goal, even if the person ultimately fired upon is not the President?
Opinions:
Majority - Wald
Yes. A defendant's actions can constitute an attempt to assassinate the President under 18 U.S.C. § 1751(c) once the defendant, acting with the specific intent to kill the President, takes a substantial step toward that objective. The court reasoned that federal law incorporates the Model Penal Code's definition of attempt, which requires proof of criminal purpose and a 'substantial step' in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the crime. Here, Duran's actions of purchasing weapons, traveling from Colorado to Washington, D.C., buying a concealing overcoat, and positioning himself outside the White House were all substantial steps taken with the clear intent to kill the President, as evidenced by his writings. Therefore, the crime of attempted assassination was already complete before Duran fired a single shot. The fact that he ultimately fired at a man who merely resembled the President does not negate the crime; rather, it serves as further evidence of his original criminal purpose.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the application of the Model Penal Code's 'substantial step' test for the crime of attempt in federal law, particularly for high-profile offenses. The court's focus on the defendant's preparatory acts, rather than the final, unsuccessful act, establishes that the crime of attempt can be completed well before the intended harm is imminent. This gives prosecutors a strong tool for securing convictions even when factual impossibility or a defendant's mistake prevents the completion of the substantive crime. The ruling reinforces that criminal liability for attempt hinges on the defendant's manifested intent and the unequivocal nature of their actions leading up to the final act.
