United States v. Fokker Services B.V.
818 F.3d 733, 422 U.S. App. D.C. 65, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6176 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
A court's authority under the Speedy Trial Act to approve the exclusion of time for a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) is limited to ensuring the agreement is not a pretext to evade trial deadlines and does not empower the court to reject the agreement based on disagreement with the Executive Branch's discretionary charging decisions.
Facts:
- Fokker Services, a Dutch aerospace company, participated in 1,147 illicit transactions with sanctioned countries, including Iran and Sudan, from 2005 to 2010, earning approximately $21 million in gross revenue.
- In 2010, Fokker Services voluntarily disclosed its potential violations of federal sanctions and export control laws to the U.S. government before any investigation had been initiated against it.
- Over the next four years, Fokker Services cooperated extensively with the government's investigation, conducted its own internal investigation, and implemented significant remedial measures, including firing its president.
- The government and Fokker Services negotiated a global settlement that included an 18-month Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA).
- Under the DPA, Fokker Services agreed to pay a $21 million penalty, continue cooperating with the government, and implement an enhanced compliance program.
- The DPA resolved the criminal case against the corporation but did not include criminal charges against any individual company officers.
Procedural Posture:
- The U.S. government filed a one-count criminal information against Fokker Services in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
- The government and Fokker Services then filed a joint motion requesting the court to exclude the 18-month term of their Deferred Prosecution Agreement from the Speedy Trial Act's time limits.
- The district court, after expressing concerns that the DPA was too lenient and did not prosecute any individuals, denied the joint motion.
- Both the government (as petitioner) and Fokker Services appealed the denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which treated the matter as a petition for a writ of mandamus.
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Issue:
Does a district court have the authority under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2), to deny a joint motion to exclude time for a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) based on its disagreement with the substantive terms of the agreement, such as the prosecution's decision not to charge individuals?
Opinions:
Majority - Srinivasan
No. A district court exceeds its authority under the Speedy Trial Act by withholding approval of a DPA based on the view that the prosecution has been too lenient or should have brought different charges. The Constitution grants the Executive Branch primacy over criminal charging decisions, a core function rooted in the separation of powers. The Speedy Trial Act's requirement for 'approval of the court' does not confer free-ranging authority for judicial oversight of prosecutorial discretion. Instead, this language must be read narrowly, analogous to the 'leave of court' requirement in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) for dismissing an indictment. The court's role is limited to ensuring the DPA serves the bona fide purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate good conduct and is not a mere pretext to evade the Act's time limits. Because the district court here rejected the DPA based on its disagreement with the prosecution's decisions—such as not charging individuals and the size of the fine—it impermissibly assumed the role of the Attorney General and intruded upon a core executive prerogative.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinforces the principle of prosecutorial discretion and the separation of powers, narrowly constraining judicial oversight of Deferred Prosecution Agreements. It clarifies that a judge's role in the DPA process is primarily procedural—to prevent abuse of the Speedy Trial Act—not to substantively evaluate the merits of the prosecution's enforcement decisions. The ruling solidifies the DPA as a powerful tool for the Executive Branch in corporate criminal enforcement, shielding these agreements from judicial second-guessing about their perceived leniency. This precedent makes it highly unlikely that future DPAs will be rejected by federal courts on the grounds that the government should have been tougher on a corporate defendant or its employees.
