United States v. Feola
1975 U.S. LEXIS 4, 420 US 671, 43 L. Ed. 2d 541 (1975)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
To sustain a conviction for conspiracy to commit a federal offense, the government does not need to prove that the defendant knew the facts that confer federal jurisdiction, so long as knowledge of those facts is not an element of the underlying substantive offense.
Facts:
- Respondent Feola and three confederates arranged to sell heroin to a group of buyers.
- The intended buyers were, in fact, undercover agents for the federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
- Feola and his group planned to deceive the buyers by providing a form of sugar instead of heroin.
- As a backup plan, the group intended to assault the buyers and forcibly take the cash they had brought for the purchase.
- The plan was thwarted when one of the undercover agents became suspicious and drew his weapon to counter an assault on another agent.
- At no point during these events were Feola or his confederates aware that their intended victims were federal officers.
Procedural Posture:
- Respondent Feola and three others were indicted in a federal district court for conspiracy to assault a federal officer (18 U.S.C. § 371) and for the substantive crime of assaulting a federal officer (18 U.S.C. § 111).
- A jury in the trial court found all defendants guilty on both charges.
- Feola appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction for the substantive assault but reversed the conspiracy conviction.
- The appellate court ruled it was plain error for the trial court not to instruct the jury that knowledge of the victim's federal identity was a required element for the conspiracy charge.
- The United States (the Government), as petitioner, sought and was granted a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States to review the reversal of Feola's conspiracy conviction.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a conviction for conspiracy to assault a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 371 require the government to prove that the conspirators knew their intended victim was a federal officer?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Blackmun
No. To obtain a conviction for conspiracy to assault a federal officer, the government is not required to prove that the conspirators knew their victim was a federal officer. First, the Court determined that the substantive offense of assaulting a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111 does not require knowledge of the victim's official status. The statute's dual purposes of protecting federal officers and federal functions are best served by not imposing a strict scienter requirement, which would undermine protection for undercover agents. An individual who commits an inherently wrongful act like assault 'takes his victim as he finds him.' Second, the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, requires only that the government prove the degree of criminal intent necessary for the underlying substantive offense. The Court rejected the 'traffic light' analogy from United States v. Crimmins, finding it inapt for crimes that are malum in se (wrong in themselves), like assault, where one cannot be ignorant of the victim's existence. The societal dangers posed by a criminal agreement do not diminish simply because the conspirators are unaware of the jurisdictional fact that makes their planned conduct a federal crime.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Stewart
Yes. A conviction for conspiracy to assault a federal officer should require proof that the assailant knew or had reason to know the victim was an officer. The dissent argues that 18 U.S.C. § 111 should be interpreted as a federal aggravated assault statute, similar to state laws which invariably require scienter as an essential element. The enhanced penalty is intended to deter attacks on officers, a purpose which is not served if the assailant is unaware of the victim's status. The dissent contends that the majority's interpretation that Congress intended to protect undercover agents is 'nonsense' because the only deterrent for an unknowing assailant is the general state law of assault. Furthermore, the other acts proscribed in § 111, such as resisting, impeding, or interfering, logically imply knowledge of the victim's official capacity, and assault should not be treated differently. To punish an unknowing assault on a federal officer as harshly as a knowing one creates a 'very real risk of unfairness' and is an exercise in judicial legislation.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the mens rea requirement for federal conspiracy charges, particularly for offenses where federal jurisdiction depends on a specific factual element unknown to the defendant. By holding that the intent for conspiracy tracks the intent for the substantive offense, the Court resolved a circuit split and rejected the influential 'Crimmins' doctrine, which had required proof of 'antifederal' intent. The ruling simplifies federal prosecutions by removing the burden of proving that conspirators were aware of the federal nexus of their criminal plan, as long as the underlying crime itself does not require such knowledge. This precedent strengthens the government's ability to prosecute organized criminal activity that incidentally affects federal interests, such as attacks on undercover officers.
Unlock the full brief for United States v. Feola