United States v. Farrar
281 U.S. 624, 50 S. Ct. 425, 1930 U.S. LEXIS 411 (1930)
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Rule of Law:
The National Prohibition Act does not impose criminal liability on the ordinary purchaser of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes. The Act's prohibitions on purchasing liquor without a permit apply only to persons authorized to deal in liquor for nonbeverage purposes, not to the general public buying it illegally.
Facts:
- The National Prohibition Act was in effect, generally prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes.
- The defendant knowingly purchased intoxicating liquor.
- The liquor purchased by the defendant was fit for use for beverage purposes.
- The defendant was an ordinary purchaser and did not hold, nor could he have obtained, a permit for the purchase.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was charged by indictment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts with unlawfully purchasing intoxicating liquor.
- The defendant filed a motion to quash the indictment, arguing his actions did not constitute a crime under the National Prohibition Act.
- The district court sustained the motion and quashed the indictment.
- The United States government, as the prosecution, appealed the district court's decision directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does the National Prohibition Act make the ordinary, illegal purchase of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes a criminal offense?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Sutherland
No, the National Prohibition Act does not make the ordinary purchase of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes a criminal offense. The Court reasoned that the Act creates two distinct regulatory schemes: one for illegal beverage liquors and one for legal nonbeverage liquors. Section 3, which deals with illegal beverage liquors, criminalizes the sale but deliberately omits the purchase. Section 6, which prohibits purchasing liquor without a permit, applies only to the regulated, lawful traffic in liquor for nonbeverage purposes (e.g., medicinal, scientific). The Court noted the long-standing common law principle that a purchaser is not an accomplice to an illegal sale unless a statute expressly provides otherwise. It inferred that Congress, aware of this history, intentionally chose not to penalize the purchaser of beverage liquor, possibly to encourage purchasers to testify against sellers. This interpretation was further supported by ten years of uniform administrative practice by executive departments, which had never prosecuted purchasers, and Congress's acquiescence to that practice.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrowed the scope of criminal liability under the National Prohibition Act, effectively immunizing the consumer from prosecution and focusing enforcement efforts on sellers and producers. It serves as a key example of statutory interpretation where the Court looked beyond the literal text of one section (the prohibition on 'purchase' in § 6) to consider the entire statutory scheme, historical legal context, and subsequent administrative practice. The ruling reinforced the principle that criminal liability will not be inferred by courts where a legislature has conspicuously omitted it, especially when such an omission aligns with established common law traditions.
