United States v. Ewell et al.
383 U.S. 116 (1966)
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Rule of Law:
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is not violated per se by the passage of time between an original arrest and a subsequent re-indictment when the delay is precipitated by the defendant's successful collateral attack on the initial conviction, absent a showing of purposeful government delay or specific, articulable prejudice to the defense.
Facts:
- In December 1962, Clarence Ewell and Ronald Dennis were alleged to have sold narcotics.
- Their initial indictments for these sales under 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a) did not name the purchasers of the narcotics.
- After their convictions were set aside due to a legal defect in the indictments, they were re-indicted in 1964 for the exact same sales.
- The new indictments charged them not only with the original offense but also added two new charges under different statutes (26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 174) based on the same underlying conduct.
- A total of 19 months elapsed between the date of their original arrests and the hearings on the new indictments.
- Ewell and Dennis did not allege any specific evidence had been lost or that any particular witnesses had become unavailable due to the passage of time.
Procedural Posture:
- Clarence Ewell and Ronald Dennis were indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.
- After pleading guilty, they were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.
- Following an unrelated appellate court decision, Ewell and Dennis filed motions in the District Court to vacate their convictions.
- The District Court granted their motions, vacating the convictions.
- The Government re-arrested and re-indicted them on three counts for the same underlying sales.
- Appellees moved to dismiss the new indictments, arguing violations of their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
- The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the indictments.
- The Government (appellant) appealed the dismissal of one count of each indictment directly to the Supreme Court of the United States, with Ewell and Dennis as appellees.
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Issue:
Does a 19-month delay between a defendant's original arrest and a subsequent indictment, which occurred after the defendant successfully had the initial conviction vacated, violate the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial when the delay was not purposeful or oppressive by the government and the defendant has not shown specific prejudice to their defense?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice White
No, a 19-month delay between an original arrest and a re-indictment following a defendant's successful legal challenge does not in itself violate the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial is relative and depends on the circumstances; its purpose is to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimize anxiety for the accused, and limit impairment of the defense. The delay here was not purposeful or oppressive but was a consequence of the appellees' own successful motions to vacate their convictions. Citing United States v. Ball, the court affirmed the principle that a defendant who obtains a reversal of a conviction may be retried in the normal course of events. The appellees' claim of prejudice is speculative and premature, as they have identified no lost evidence or missing witnesses, and the new charges are based on the same sales they were already on notice to defend.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Fortas
No, the government may not, consistent with due process, re-indict a defendant for additional, more serious offenses arising out of the same transaction after that defendant has successfully challenged their original conviction. While retrial for the same offense would be permissible, adding charges with the potential for cumulative sentences penalizes the defendant for exercising their statutory right to appeal. This places the defendant in an 'incredible dilemma,' as described in Green v. United States. The prosecutor's stated purpose was to discourage other inmates from challenging their convictions, which amounts to an impermissible 'booby trap' on the right of review. The government's belated offer to drop the additional charges does not cure the unlawfulness of the indictment it presented.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Brennan
No, there is no constitutional violation here only because the government has now limited its prosecution to a single charge that does not prejudice the appellees. However, the government's initial tactic of re-indicting on three separate offenses after the appellees' successful appeal was 'most oppressive.' This conduct raises serious due process questions, as it appears calculated to punish the appellees for asserting their rights or to pressure them into a guilty plea. While the end result in this specific case is acceptable, the Court's opinion should not be read as an approval of such prosecutorial tactics.
Analysis:
This case clarifies that the speedy trial clock is not a simple chronological measure and that delays caused by a defendant's own successful legal actions are generally not held against the government. It establishes that for a speedy trial claim to succeed in this context, the defendant must show more than just the passage of time; they must demonstrate either oppressive or purposeful government conduct or actual prejudice to their defense. The decision also foreshadows later developments in the law regarding prosecutorial vindictiveness, as the concurring and dissenting opinions highlight the due process concerns raised when a defendant faces harsher charges after a successful appeal.
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