United States v. Evans Santos Diaz
N/A (2020)
Rule of Law:
District courts must inquire into a defendant's requests for new counsel unless there's a reasonable basis to believe the issues are resolved; lay opinion testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 cannot offer legal conclusions or interpret clear, non-coded statements; and while such testimony may be error, it does not warrant reversal under plain error review if the defendant was not prejudiced by it given other strong evidence of guilt.
Facts:
- Evans Santos Diaz was charged, along with five co-defendants, with conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine as a subordinate in a drug operation orchestrated by Jeffrey Guzman.
- Diaz repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with his court-appointed attorney, Joseph Kalinowski, sending pro se letters to the court alleging Kalinowski failed to respond to his letters, provide discovery materials, or visit him, and requesting new counsel.
- Kalinowski filed a motion for continuance, representing to the District Court that he had met with Diaz, all issues between them had been resolved, and Diaz wished to continue with his representation.
- At trial, Drug Enforcement Administration Task Force Officer Jason Gula testified, stating his opinion that Diaz was Guzman's subordinate, bagging and distributing drugs, and interpreting allegedly non-coded conversations involving Diaz (e.g., 'these bags are different sizes,' 'come on the guy is at the barbershop waiting for me') as referring to narcotics activity.
- Following Diaz's conviction by a jury, a presentence investigation report (PSR) attributed 30 grams of heroin to him, resulting in a base offense level of 16.
- Diaz objected to the drug quantity determination, arguing the evidence only supported a finding of 15 grams, but the District Court concluded that 30 grams was an appropriate amount based on co-conspirator testimony and intercepted communications.
Procedural Posture:
- Evans Santos Diaz was indicted with five co-defendants for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute drugs in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
- Diaz was initially appointed CJA counsel Deborah Albert-Heise, then Joseph O’Brien.
- Diaz sent a pro se letter to the Clerk of Court requesting new counsel, alleging issues with O'Brien, leading the District Court to hold a hearing.
- The District Court appointed Joseph Kalinowski as new counsel for Diaz.
- Diaz subsequently sent additional letters to the District Court complaining about Kalinowski's representation and requesting discovery, and then new counsel, but no further hearings were held on these later requests.
- Kalinowski filed a motion for continuance, representing that issues with Diaz had been resolved.
- A jury in the District Court convicted Diaz of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine, and crack.
- The District Court sentenced Diaz to 33 months imprisonment and three years of supervised release, attributing 30 grams of heroin to him.
- Diaz appealed his conviction and sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the Appellant).
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Issue:
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by failing to conduct a further inquiry into Evans Santos Diaz's pro se requests for appointment of new counsel? 2. Did the District Court plainly err by admitting DEA Task Force Officer Gula's conclusory testimony about Diaz's role in the drug conspiracy and his interpretation of non-coded communications, in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 701? 3. Did the District Court clearly err in attributing at least 20 grams of heroin to Evans Santos Diaz at sentencing, which increased his base offense level?
Opinions:
Majority - Rendell, Circuit Judge
1. No, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct a further inquiry into Evans Santos Diaz's pro se requests for appointment of new counsel. While the court's initial inaction on Diaz's complaints about Kalinowski was undesirable, it subsequently received information that Kalinowski was communicating with Diaz and that Diaz no longer sought new counsel. Specifically, Kalinowski filed a motion for continuance stating that he had met with Diaz, resolved all issues, and that Diaz wished to continue with his representation. Given Diaz's subsequent appearance with Kalinowski at a pretrial conference without further complaint, and his failure to renew his request for new counsel either before or at trial, the District Court had a reasonable basis to believe the issues were resolved, thereby making further inquiry unnecessary and not constituting an abuse of discretion. 2. Yes, the District Court plainly erred by admitting DEA Task Force Officer Gula's conclusory testimony about Diaz's role in the drug conspiracy and his interpretation of non-coded communications, in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 701; however, this error does not warrant reversal under the plain error standard. The court found that Gula's testimony opining on Diaz's role as Guzman's subordinate bagging and distributing drugs was unhelpful and usurped the jury's fact-finding function. Similarly, Gula's interpretation of clear, non-coded statements (e.g., about 'bags' or 'barbershop') was also unhelpful, as the jury could have interpreted these for themselves. Despite these clear violations of Rule 701(b)'s helpfulness requirement, the plain error standard for reversal was not met because the improper testimony did not prejudice Diaz's substantial rights or affect the trial's outcome. The prosecution introduced considerable other evidence of Diaz’s involvement, including co-defendant testimony, other investigators, and numerous calls and text messages. Furthermore, defense counsel's cross-examination mitigated the impact of Gula's testimony, and the prosecutor did not rely on the improper testimony in summation, thus not seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. 3. No, the District Court did not clearly err in attributing at least 20 grams of heroin to Evans Santos Diaz at sentencing. The court reviews the District Court’s factual determination of drug quantity for clear error. While Diaz disputed the 30-gram attribution, the evidence supported a finding of at least 20 grams, which is the minimum threshold for base offense level 16. Co-conspirator testimony indicated Diaz 'normally' bagged 500 bags (approximately 15 grams) for $100 and that this occurred at least once, with another witness testifying to seeing Diaz bagging drugs twice, and Guzman testifying he gave Diaz heroin twice. Even if the second occasion involved less than a full 'normal' amount, multiple other communications indicated Diaz repeatedly worked for or sought work from Guzman. The District Court had ample basis to estimate at least 20 grams, and any error in precisely attributing 30 grams (rather than, for example, 22.5 grams) was harmless because it did not change the applicable Guidelines range.
Analysis:
This case highlights the careful balance courts must strike regarding a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the limits of lay opinion testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701. It clarifies that a district court's initial obligation to inquire into counsel substitution requests can be satisfied, or further inquiry rendered moot, by subsequent events indicating a resolution between attorney and client. The ruling strongly reinforces the prohibition against lay witnesses offering legal conclusions or interpreting clear, non-coded statements, particularly by law enforcement officers, as such testimony usurps the jury's role. However, it also demonstrates the high bar for reversal under the plain error standard, emphasizing that even clear evidentiary errors may be deemed harmless if substantial other evidence supports the conviction and the error does not compromise the overall fairness of the proceedings.
