United States v. Eduardo Bibo-Rodriguez
91 Daily Journal DAR 185, 32 Fed. R. Serv. 145, 922 F.2d 1398 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) does not distinguish between prior and subsequent "other acts," and therefore evidence of a defendant's subsequent criminal acts may be admissible to prove knowledge regarding a prior charged offense.
Facts:
- On September 26, 1988, Eduardo Bibo-Rodriguez drove a truck from Mexico into the United States, which was found by Customs agents to contain 678 kilograms of cocaine hidden in the roof.
- Agents allowed Bibo-Rodriguez to proceed into the United States, where he left the truck in a parking lot and returned to Mexico.
- On December 2, 1988, Bibo-Rodriguez was arrested in Los Angeles for possession of thirty pounds of marijuana for sale.
- Following his December arrest, Bibo-Rodriguez stated to Officer James Martin that he routinely transported both marijuana and cocaine from Mexico into the United States, had done so on numerous occasions, and used trucks for larger quantities.
- Bibo-Rodriguez admitted to Officer Martin that on December 2, he had transported the marijuana in the hollowed-out side panels of a car.
- After the December arrest, Bibo-Rodriguez posted bail and returned to Mexico.
- On June 12, 1989, Bibo-Rodriguez was stopped again at the border, at which time an outstanding warrant for the September 1988 cocaine importation was discovered.
- When questioned about the September incident, Bibo-Rodriguez claimed a friend paid him fifty dollars to drive the truck and that he had no knowledge of the cocaine.
Procedural Posture:
- Eduardo Bibo-Rodriguez was charged in the United States District Court with importing cocaine.
- Prior to trial, Bibo-Rodriguez filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of his subsequent December 2, 1988 arrest for marijuana possession and the statements he made to police.
- The government opposed the motion, arguing the evidence was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to prove Bibo-Rodriguez's knowledge.
- The district court denied Bibo-Rodriguez's motion.
- Bibo-Rodriguez entered a conditional guilty plea, which reserved his right to appeal the district court's pretrial ruling on the evidentiary motion.
- Bibo-Rodriguez (appellant) appealed the district court's ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibit the admission of a defendant's subsequent "other acts" to prove knowledge of a prior charged offense?
Opinions:
Majority - Boochever, Circuit Judge
No. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) does not distinguish between prior and subsequent 'other acts,' and such evidence is admissible to prove knowledge. The text of Rule 404(b) does not make a temporal distinction, simply stating 'other crimes, wrongs, or acts.' The court noted it had previously allowed subsequent act evidence to prove intent in United States v. Mehrmanesh. The court reasoned that the logical inference of knowledge is identical whether the act is prior or subsequent; a person who knowingly transports drugs shortly after the charged offense is less likely to have been an innocent dupe during the charged offense. The court explicitly declined to follow the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits, which had disallowed such evidence, holding that the district court did not err in refusing to distinguish between subsequent and prior other act evidence.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the Ninth Circuit's position that the admissibility of 'other act' evidence under FRE 404(b) is not dependent on whether the act occurred before or after the charged offense. By explicitly rejecting the contrary holdings of three other circuit courts, the opinion widens a circuit split on this evidentiary issue. This ruling broadens the scope of evidence available to prosecutors to prove a defendant's mens rea, particularly knowledge or intent, by allowing them to introduce a defendant's later conduct as circumstantial evidence of their state of mind during an earlier crime.
