United States v. Eddy Wilmer Vail-Bailon
868 F.3d 1293, 2017 WL 3667647, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16283 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
An offense that requires as an element an intentional touching or striking that in fact causes "great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement" categorically qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines because force that actually causes such injury is necessarily force capable of causing physical pain or injury.
Facts:
- Eddy Wilmer Vail-Bailon, a citizen of Guatemala, was convicted of felony battery under Florida Statute § 784.041.
- Following his felony battery conviction, Vail-Bailon was deported from the United States in 2008.
- In 2014, Vail-Bailon was found and arrested in Palm Beach County, Florida.
Procedural Posture:
- Eddy Wilmer Vail-Bailon was charged in federal district court with illegally reentering the United States.
- Vail-Bailon pled guilty to the charge.
- At sentencing, the district court applied a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, ruling that Vail-Bailon's prior Florida felony battery conviction was a 'crime of violence.'
- Vail-Bailon appealed his sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
- A divided three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit agreed with Vail-Bailon and vacated his sentence.
- The Government, as appellee, petitioned for a rehearing en banc, which the full Eleventh Circuit granted, thereby vacating the panel's opinion.
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Issue:
Does a conviction for felony battery under Florida Statute § 784.041 categorically qualify as a "crime of violence" under the elements clause of U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 2L1.2?
Opinions:
Majority - Julie Carnes, Circuit Judge
Yes, Florida felony battery does categorically qualify as a crime of violence under § 2L1.2 of the Guidelines. The Supreme Court in Curtis Johnson defined 'physical force' as 'violent force — that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.' The Florida felony battery statute requires not only an intentional touching but also that this touching cause 'great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement.' Force that actually causes this level of severe injury necessarily was capable of causing that injury, thereby satisfying the Curtis Johnson definition. Hypothetical scenarios involving minimal touches causing freak accidents are 'legal imagination' and not a basis for invalidating the statute under the categorical approach, as there must be a 'realistic probability' of such prosecutions, which has not been shown.
Dissenting - Wilson, Circuit Judge
No, Florida felony battery is not categorically a crime of violence because it does not require a sufficient degree of force. The statute criminalizes a mere touching that happens to cause great bodily harm, which is the same actus reus as simple battery, a crime the Supreme Court in Curtis Johnson held does not involve 'physical force.' A non-violent act, like a slight tap, does not become violent simply because it leads to an unintended, severe injury. The majority misreads Curtis Johnson by creating a 'capacity test' based on the result of the act, rather than adhering to the Supreme Court's focus on the 'degree of force' used, which must be substantial and violent in nature.
Dissenting - Rosenbaum, Circuit Judge
No, Florida felony battery does not qualify as a crime of violence under the federal definition. The statute has two elements: (1) an intentional touching, which Curtis Johnson held does not satisfy the 'physical force' requirement, and (2) causing great bodily harm. The second element fails the 'use' requirement of the elements clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Leocal, Castleman, and Voisine. Because felony battery is a general intent crime and does not require intent to harm or even recklessness as to causing harm, a conviction can result from an accident. An accidental or unintended injury resulting from a mere touch does not constitute the 'use' of physical force in the active, volitional sense required by Supreme Court precedent.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the interpretation of 'physical force' under the categorical approach, particularly for statutes linking a minimal physical act to a severe result. The court's holding emphasizes that the actual causation of 'great bodily harm' is sufficient to infer that the force used was 'capable' of causing injury, thereby meeting the Curtis Johnson standard. This result-oriented analysis makes it more difficult for defendants to challenge 'crime of violence' enhancements by positing improbable hypotheticals. The decision creates a clear distinction between simple battery (requiring only a touch) and felony battery (requiring a touch plus severe harm), establishing the latter as a categorical crime of violence in the Eleventh Circuit.
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