United States v. Durrell Smith
725 F.3d 340, 92 Fed. R. Serv. 85, 2013 WL 3985005 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of a prior bad act offered to prove motive is inadmissible if the chain of logical inferences connecting the prior act to the motive requires an intermediate inference that the defendant has a certain character and acted in conformity with that character on the occasion in question.
Facts:
- In September 2008, FBI Agent Michael Brooks observed Durrell Smith engage in a sale of heroin on a street corner in Newark; no firearms were involved in this incident.
- Two years later, on September 1, 2010, FBI Agent Michael Alerassool and other officers were conducting surveillance in an unmarked car on the same street corner.
- Smith, who was present on the corner, stared at the unmarked vehicle, disappeared from sight, and returned approximately one minute later holding a handgun.
- As Smith walked toward the vehicle, he began to turn his shoulder to face the officers.
- The officers arrested Smith before he reached the car, recovering a handgun but finding no drugs on his person.
- After his arrest, Smith stated that he retrieved the gun for self-defense because a recent shooting nearby involving a similar car made him fear for his life.
Procedural Posture:
- Durrell Smith was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey for threatening a federal officer, using a firearm during a crime of violence, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
- Before trial, the Government moved in limine to admit evidence of Smith's 2008 drug transaction under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to prove his motive.
- Smith objected, arguing the evidence was impermissible propensity evidence.
- The District Court granted the Government's motion, admitting the evidence.
- A jury convicted Smith on all counts, and he was sentenced to 360 months (30 years) imprisonment.
- Smith, as the appellant, appealed the conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, arguing the District Court erred in its evidentiary ruling. The United States was the appellee.
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Issue:
Does the admission of evidence that a defendant engaged in a drug sale two years prior to an alleged assault, offered to prove the defendant's motive was to protect his 'drug turf,' violate Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)'s prohibition on propensity evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - Fuentes, Circuit Judge
Yes. Admitting evidence of a defendant's prior, two-year-old drug sale to prove a motive for a present assault charge violates Rule 404(b)'s prohibition against propensity evidence. The government's argument requires a forbidden chain of inferences: first, that the 2008 drug deal proves Smith's character as a drug dealer, and second, that Smith acted in conformity with that character in 2010 by continuing to be a drug dealer, thus giving him the motive to protect his 'turf.' This reasoning relies directly on a propensity inference—that because Smith was a drug dealer before, he was more likely to be one at the time of the charged offense—which is precisely what Rule 404(b) is designed to prevent. The significant temporal separation (two years) and the dissimilarity between the acts (a non-violent drug sale versus an armed assault) further weaken the connection, making the propensity inference indispensable to the government's theory of motive. The court also found the district court's Rule 403 balancing insufficient, as it acknowledged the evidence was 'significantly prejudicial' without adequately explaining why it was not 'unfairly' so.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the strict prohibition on propensity evidence under Rule 404(b), even when the evidence is ostensibly offered for a permissible purpose like proving motive. It clarifies that courts must meticulously examine the 'chain of logical inferences' to ensure that no link depends on a forbidden character-conformity assumption. The ruling cautions against admitting evidence of prior bad acts that are temporally remote or factually dissimilar to the charged crime, as their probative value for a non-propensity purpose is often too weak to stand without relying on an improper inference about the defendant's character. This case serves as a guidepost for both prosecutors and defense attorneys on the limits of using past conduct to explain present actions.
