United States v. Drayton
536 U.S. 194 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to advise bus passengers of their right to refuse consent to searches conducted during routine, non-coercive drug and weapons interdiction efforts, so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.
Facts:
- Christopher Drayton and Clifton Brown, Jr. were traveling together on a Greyhound bus.
- During a scheduled stop in Tallahassee, Florida, three plain-clothed police officers boarded the bus as part of a routine drug and weapons interdiction effort.
- One officer knelt in the driver's seat facing the passengers, one stood at the rear of the bus, and Officer Lang moved from the rear to the front, speaking with individual passengers.
- Officer Lang approached Drayton and Brown, identified himself, and asked for permission to check their shared bag. Brown consented, and no contraband was found.
- Noticing their heavy, baggy clothing despite the warm weather, Lang asked Brown for permission to search his person. Brown agreed.
- Lang discovered hard objects in Brown's thigh areas, which were later found to be bundles of cocaine, and arrested him.
- Lang then asked Drayton, 'Mind if I check you?' Drayton responded by lifting his hands from his legs, and a similar search revealed cocaine on his person as well.
- At no point did the officers inform the passengers, including Drayton and Brown, that they had a right to refuse the requests to search.
Procedural Posture:
- Christopher Drayton and Clifton Brown were charged with federal drug offenses in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida.
- The defendants filed motions to suppress the cocaine evidence, arguing their consent to be searched was not voluntary.
- The District Court, as the trial court, denied the motions to suppress, finding the encounter was cooperative and not coercive.
- The defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
- The Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that the searches were invalid because passengers must be advised that they have a right to refuse consent for the encounter to be consensual.
- The United States petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a police officer's action of boarding a bus and questioning passengers without advising them of their right to refuse cooperation constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, thereby invalidating any subsequent consent to a search?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kennedy
No. A police officer's action of boarding a bus and questioning passengers without advising them of their right to refuse cooperation does not, by itself, constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Applying the 'totality of the circumstances' test from Florida v. Bostick, the crucial inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. The Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s per se rule requiring officers to inform passengers of their right to refuse. Here, the encounter was not coercive: the officers did not brandish weapons, make intimidating movements, block the aisle, or use an authoritative tone. Because the encounter was consensual and not a seizure, the subsequent voluntary consent to search was valid. The Court reiterated that knowledge of the right to refuse consent is only one factor in the analysis, not a prerequisite for a voluntary consent as established in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.
Dissenting - Justice Souter
Yes. The police encounter in this case did constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. A reasonable passenger would not have felt free to terminate the encounter. The dissent argued that the majority failed to appreciate the inherently coercive atmosphere created when three police officers take control of a cramped, confined bus. With one officer positioned at the only exit, another acting as backup, and a third confronting passengers at extremely close quarters, the situation conveyed an 'atmosphere of obligatory participation.' The officers' statement that they were 'conducting bus interdiction' and desired 'cooperation' would lead a reasonable person to believe the process was not optional. This 'threatening presence of several officers' effectively overbore the passengers' will, rendering any subsequent consent a product of the illegal seizure, not a truly voluntary choice.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the Supreme Court's preference for a flexible 'totality of the circumstances' analysis over rigid, per se rules in Fourth Amendment seizure inquiries. By applying the principles of Florida v. Bostick, the Court clarifies that consensual encounters on buses are not constitutionally distinct from those in other public places. The ruling significantly impacts suspicionless drug interdiction programs on public transport by removing any obligation for police to give warnings similar to those in Miranda. Consequently, it places the onus on citizens to know and assert their right to refuse consent, even in environments that may feel inherently coercive due to police presence and physical confinement.
