United States v. Drapeau
644 F.3d 646, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13900, 2011 WL 2652317 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
A federal officer is engaged in the performance of official duties under 18 U.S.C. § 111 so long as their actions fall within the scope of their agency's overall mission and do not constitute a 'personal frolic,' even if the specific actions are of questionable legality. A person may only use force to resist such an officer if the officer employs excessive force.
Facts:
- A resident of the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe reservation requested police patrol, stating that Harold Drapeau, Jr., and two other males might return to her residence and cause a disturbance.
- Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Officer Foote located Drapeau, but Drapeau fled in a vehicle before the officer could question him.
- BIA Officer Marlin Mousseau, Jr., proceeded to Drapeau's known residence and observed a vehicle matching the description from Officer Foote.
- Mousseau pursued and arrested Drapeau's wife, Mitzi Medicine Crow, as she ran toward the back of the residence.
- Mousseau then attempted to enter the home to speak with Drapeau and to check on the welfare of a child he heard crying inside.
- Looking through a window, Mousseau saw Drapeau's mother, Theresa Grassrope, holding a child with her hand over its mouth.
- After Grassrope refused to open the door, Mousseau broke a window screen and inserted his arm through the open window to gain entry.
- Drapeau then pressed the window downward onto Mousseau's arm, causing bodily injury.
Procedural Posture:
- Harold Drapeau, Jr. was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota for assaulting, resisting, or impeding a federal officer.
- Drapeau filed a pretrial motion seeking to present character evidence of the officer-victim, which the district court preliminarily denied in part.
- At the close of the government's case-in-chief, Drapeau moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied.
- The jury returned a verdict finding Drapeau guilty of the charge.
- The district court entered a judgment of conviction and imposed a sentence.
- Drapeau, as appellant, appealed his conviction and sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a federal officer act outside the scope of his official duties for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 111 when he attempts a warrantless, forcible entry into a home, thereby permitting an occupant to use physical force in self-defense?
Opinions:
Majority - Wollman, J.
No. A federal officer's actions remain within the scope of official duties so long as they are part of the agency's mission and not a personal endeavor, irrespective of whether the specific actions are lawful. The test is whether the officer is acting within the scope of his employment, which contrasts with engaging in a personal frolic. Here, Mousseau was on duty, responding to a dispatch involving Drapeau, and acting on concerns for a child's welfare; his actions were part of his agency's mission. Therefore, the jury had substantial evidence to find he was engaged in official duties. An individual is not justified in using force to resist an officer performing such duties unless the officer uses excessive force. A reasonable jury could conclude that Mousseau's actions—attempting entry after several minutes of trying to gain cooperation and while concerned for a child's safety—did not constitute excessive force, and thus Drapeau was not justified in using force against him.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Bright, J.
Yes, with respect to the evidentiary ruling. While agreeing that sufficient evidence supported the conviction, the district court committed a plain error that affected Drapeau's substantial rights by excluding reputation evidence of Officer Mousseau's character. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2), a defendant claiming self-defense is permitted to introduce testimony about the victim's reputation for violence to support the inference that the victim was the first aggressor. The admissibility of such evidence is not dependent on the defendant's prior knowledge of that reputation. The district court incorrectly believed that only Drapeau could testify about the officer's reputation and that prior knowledge was required, thereby denying Drapeau his fundamental right to present a defense. This error warrants a reversal and remand for a new trial.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces a broad interpretation of the phrase 'engaged in the performance of official duties' under 18 U.S.C. § 111, making it more difficult for defendants to justify resistance based on an officer's unlawful conduct. The court distinguished between actions outside the scope of employment (a 'personal frolic') and illegal actions taken within that scope, holding that only the former removes an officer from the statute's protection. The ruling significantly limits the right to resist unlawful police entry, restricting it to situations where the officer's use of force is objectively excessive. The dissent highlights a critical, and often confused, point of evidence law: character evidence offered to prove the victim's conduct (as the first aggressor) under Rule 404(a)(2) does not require the defendant's prior knowledge, unlike character evidence offered to prove the defendant's state of mind under Rule 404(b).
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