United States v. Dougherty
473 F.2d 1113 (1972)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant has a fundamental statutory right to self-representation (pro se) that must be granted if timely asserted with a valid waiver of counsel and cannot be denied based on a fear of potential disruption. However, a defendant does not have a right to a jury instruction on the jury's inherent power of nullification.
Facts:
- On March 22, 1969, a group of activists, including Michael Dougherty and other appellants (the 'D.C. Nine'), broke into the locked Washington D.C. offices of the Dow Chemical Company.
- The appellants' actions were a protest against Dow Chemical Company's role in the Vietnam War.
- Inside the offices, the appellants threw papers and documents around the room and out into the street below.
- They also vandalized office furniture and equipment, and defaced the premises by spilling a substance resembling blood.
- The appellants had arranged for members of the news media to be present to witness and photograph the event.
- Police arrived at the scene and arrested the appellants inside the offices.
Procedural Posture:
- The seven appellants were indicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on one count of second-degree burglary and two counts of malicious destruction of property.
- Prior to trial, four of the appellants filed timely motions to dispense with their court-appointed counsel and represent themselves.
- The district court judge held a hearing and denied these motions, citing the defendants' lack of legal training and the risk of disruption in a multi-defendant trial.
- The remaining three appellants then also moved to represent themselves, and the court denied their motions for the same reasons.
- The case proceeded to a jury trial.
- The jury acquitted the appellants on the second-degree burglary charge but convicted them on the lesser-included offense of unlawful entry.
- The jury convicted all seven appellants on both counts of malicious destruction of property.
- The appellants appealed their convictions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a trial court's denial of a defendant's timely motion for self-representation, based on concerns about potential disruption, lack of legal training, and the complexity of a multi-defendant trial, violate the defendant's statutory right to conduct their own defense?
Opinions:
Majority - Leventhal, Circuit Judge
Yes, the denial violates the defendants' rights. The trial court's denial of the defendants' motions for self-representation violated their fundamental statutory right to conduct their own defense. This right, provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1654, must be recognized if it is timely asserted and accompanied by a valid waiver of the right to counsel. A court cannot deny this right based on speculation about potential disruption, the defendant's lack of legal skill, or the complexity of a multi-defendant case. The proper remedy for actual disruptive behavior is to treat it as a waiver of the pro se right, and the remedy for an unmanageable multi-defendant trial is severance, not denial of the right. Furthermore, the denial of this right is not subject to harmless error analysis because it protects the defendant's dignity and autonomy, not just the trial's outcome. Regarding the issue for retrial, while juries possess the inherent power to acquit against the evidence (jury nullification), defendants do not have a right to an instruction informing the jury of this power, as it risks degrading the rule of law and promoting anarchy.
Concurring - Bazelon, Chief Judge
This opinion concurs with the majority's holding that the defendants' statutory right to self-representation was violated. However, it dissents from the majority's conclusion on jury nullification. The dissent argues that it is unjust and a 'deliberate lack of candor' to conceal the jury's nullification power. An instruction on nullification would empower conscientious jurors to carefully apply community values and prevent unjust applications of the law, whereas keeping the jury ignorant makes it more likely that nullification will be used spontaneously by jurors motivated by prejudice. The jury's role as the 'community conscience' requires that it be told of its power to disregard the strict requirements of law when justice demands it.
Dissenting - Adams, Circuit Judge
No, the denial does not violate the defendants' rights. The trial judge's denial of the pro se motions was proper and the convictions should be affirmed. This opinion concurs with the majority's statement of the law but disagrees with its application to the facts. It argues that the defendants' disruptive and disrespectful interruptions during pre-trial hearings, especially in the context of other notorious 'political' trials of the era, constituted a constructive waiver of their right to self-representation. The trial judge reasonably concluded that granting the motions would turn the trial into a 'shambles.' Because the denial was justified by the defendants' conduct, there was no violation of their rights.
Analysis:
This decision firmly establishes the right to self-representation under 28 U.S.C. § 1654 as a fundamental entitlement that trial courts must honor if timely requested by a competent defendant. It shifts the focus from a court's predictive fear of disruption to managing actual disruption, clarifying that a defendant's right cannot be preemptively denied. The court's extensive discussion on jury nullification, while technically guidance for the new trial, became a leading authority on the subject, cementing the distinction between the jury's de facto power and the defendant's lack of a de jure right to have that power explained, thereby preserving a crucial tension between formal law and jury lenity.
