United States of America v. Michael R. Dougherty, et al.
473 F.2d 1113 (1972)
Rule of Law:
A defendant in a federal criminal trial has a statutory right to self-representation if the right is timely asserted and accompanied by a valid waiver of counsel, and it cannot be denied based on a mere possibility of future trial disruption. However, a defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction informing the jury of its inherent power to nullify the law by acquitting contrary to the evidence.
Facts:
- On March 22, 1969, Michael R. Dougherty and several co-defendants, known as the 'D.C. Nine,' broke into the locked Washington, D.C. offices of the Dow Chemical Company.
- Their actions were a protest against Dow Chemical's role in supplying materials for the Vietnam War.
- Inside the offices, the defendants vandalized the premises by throwing papers and documents into the street below.
- They also damaged office furniture and equipment and defaced the property with a blood-like substance.
- The defendants had invited members of the news media to the scene to witness and photograph their actions.
- Police arrived and arrested the defendants at the scene of the incident.
Procedural Posture:
- Michael R. Dougherty and six co-defendants were charged by indictment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia with second-degree burglary and two counts of malicious destruction of property.
- Prior to trial, several defendants made timely motions to discharge their court-appointed attorneys and proceed pro se (represent themselves).
- The district court judge conducted a hearing and denied the motions, citing concerns about the defendants' lack of legal training, the complexity of a multi-defendant trial, and the potential for disruption.
- Following a six-day jury trial, the defendants were acquitted of burglary but convicted of the lesser-included offense of unlawful entry and both counts of malicious destruction of property.
- The seven convicted defendants (appellants) filed a joint appeal of their convictions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a trial court violate a defendant's statutory right to self-representation by denying a timely, pre-trial motion to proceed pro se based on the judge's assessment that doing so creates a significant risk of trial disruption?
Opinions:
Majority - Leventhal
Yes. A trial court violates a defendant's statutory right to self-representation by denying a timely pro se motion based on a mere possibility of disruption. The right to self-representation under 28 U.S.C. § 1654 is a fundamental statutory right that must be honored if it is asserted timely (before trial), accompanied by a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and has not been waived through disruptive behavior. A trial judge's prediction of potential unruliness or confusion is an insufficient basis to deny this right pre-emptively; the proper remedy for actual disruption is to treat it as a constructive waiver and, if necessary, terminate the pro se representation at that time. The court also held that defendants are not entitled to a jury instruction on the doctrine of jury nullification. While the jury possesses the de facto power to acquit in disregard of the law, instructing it on this power would risk anarchy and undermine the stability of the rule of law. The jury's power of lenity serves as an informal 'safety valve' for exceptional cases, and this balance is best maintained by not formally legitimizing it in the court's instructions.
Concurring - Bazelon
Yes, on the right to self-representation, but the court should also require an instruction on jury nullification. I concur that the denial of the right to self-representation was an error. However, I dissent from the majority's holding on jury nullification. The court's refusal to permit a nullification instruction amounts to a 'deliberate lack of candor' that keeps the jury ignorant of its full power as the community's conscience. The fear that juries will abuse this power is speculative; it is more plausible that a conscientious juror, unaware of the nullification power, will feel compelled to convict against their own moral judgment. Trust in the jury, a cornerstone of our justice system, requires that jurors be fully informed of their prerogative to acquit when a conviction would be unjust.
Dissenting - Adams
No. The trial court did not violate the defendants' right to self-representation because they had constructively waived it through their pre-trial conduct. The record demonstrates that the defendants repeatedly interrupted the proceedings and behaved disrespectfully, giving the trial judge a reasonable basis to fear significant disruption. In the context of other tumultuous 'political' trials of that era, the judge's decision to deny the pro se motions was a proper exercise of his duty to maintain an orderly trial. The defendants' actions constituted an anticipatory waiver of their right to represent themselves. I concur with the majority's reasoning and holding on the jury nullification issue.
Analysis:
United States v. Dougherty solidifies the statutory right to self-representation in federal courts, establishing that it cannot be denied pre-trial based solely on a judge's speculation about potential disruption. This holding raises the threshold for denying a pro se request, requiring evidence of actual misconduct or an invalid waiver of counsel. Simultaneously, the case is a leading authority on jury nullification, establishing the modern federal judiciary's position: the power exists as a matter of fact but is not a right that must be explained to the jury. This decision creates a durable legal framework that protects a defendant's autonomy while preserving the institutional role of the judge as the sole arbiter of the law presented in court.
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