Yes, the president can be held responsible. The law protecting our food and drugs is meant to keep everyone safe. To make sure companies follow these important rules, the law can punish the people in charge. The court said that anyone in a position of authority, like a company president, has a 'responsible share' in the company's actions. Because of this, they can be held guilty if the company breaks the law, even if they weren't aware of the specific problem. It's a strict rule to protect the public, who can't protect themselves.

No, this is unfair and goes against our legal traditions. A person shouldn't be found guilty of a crime if they didn't do anything wrong or know about the wrongdoing. The law says 'any person' can be guilty, but it never specifically says that a boss is automatically guilty for what the company does. In fact, when writing the law, Congress considered and then removed specific words that would have made bosses liable. This shows they didn't want this result. Blaming a person just because of their job title is wrong.

Yes, a boss can get in trouble under this special law, even if they didn't know their company was sending out bad medicines. The law is very strict because it's so important to keep people safe. It says that people in charge have to make sure their company follows the rules, even if they don't know all the details. The Court said this is especially important nowadays when people can't always tell if medicines are safe or not. If a company does something wrong, the people in charge can get in trouble unless they have a special piece of paper saying everything is okay. It might seem unfair, but the Court said it's more important to protect people who could get hurt by bad medicines.

The judges who disagreed said that the special food and drug law doesn't clearly say that bosses can get in trouble if they didn't know about or help with the bad stuff their company did. They think it's not fair to blame the boss, Mr. Dotterweich, when there's no proof he did anything wrong himself. They looked at the history of the law and saw that the people who wrote it decided not to put in parts that would get bosses in trouble. The disagreeing judges worry it's dangerous to let courts decide these things without clear rules from the lawmakers.

The purposes of this legislation thus touch phases of the lives and health of people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection.

The Court has explained that there exists " `a now familiar type of legislation whereby penalties serve as effective means of regulation'... `[and] such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but …

In Dotterweich, the United States Supreme Court held that a corporate officer may be held personally liable for the corporation's violation of strict liability provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act because the officer had a "responsible share in furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws."

—a corporate president was convicted under a statute which prohibited the " `introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any drug that is adulterated or misbranded.'"

In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger.

—keep impure and adulterated food and drugs out of the channels of commerce. By the Act of 1938, Congress extended the range of its control over illicit and noxious articles***. The purposes of this legislation thus touch phases of the lives and health of people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection. Regard for these …

—the Court, in a five to four opinion, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, said, in discussing the penalties provided by the Food and Drug Act: "Hardship there doubtless may be under a statute which thus penalizes the transaction though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting. Balancing relative hardships, Congress has preferred to place it upon those who …

For example, the Court has recognized that statutes regulating dangerous drugs and hand grenades can properly be considered public welfare statutes.

It is well established that a governmental entity, like a corporation, can act only through its individual officers and employees

Equally baseless is the claim of [defendant] that, having failed to find the corporation guilty, the jury could not find him guilty

Yes, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act permits the criminal conviction of a corporate officer who had a responsible share in the furtherance of the illegal transaction. The Act is public welfare legislation that dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of public health and safety, it places the burden on individuals who stand in a responsible relation to a public danger. A corporation can only act through its individual agents, and to hold that only the corporation could be liable would defeat the Act's purpose of strengthening consumer protection. The offense is committed by all who have a 'responsible share' in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws, and Congress chose to place the hardship of this strict liability on those able to prevent violations rather than on the innocent public.

No, a corporate officer cannot be held criminally liable without clear statutory authorization and without personal knowledge or participation in the wrongdoing. The fundamental principle of jurisprudence that guilt is personal should not be abandoned without an unambiguous legislative mandate. The statute's use of the term 'any person' is not specific enough to impose vicarious criminal liability on corporate officers. The legislative history demonstrates that Congress considered and deliberately omitted language that would have explicitly held officers liable, indicating an intent to exempt them. To hold an individual criminally liable based on their position alone, and to leave the determination to the 'good sense of prosecutors,' violates the principle that the legislature, not the courts, must define criminal conduct and identify offenders with clarity.

Yes, a corporate officer can be held criminally liable under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for the introduction of adulterated or misbranded drugs into interstate commerce, even without personal knowledge or intent to defraud. The Act imposes strict liability on those in a responsible position to protect public welfare, regardless of their awareness of wrongdoing. The Court emphasized the importance of this regulatory scheme in the context of modern industrialism, where individuals are largely incapable of self-protection against such public dangers. The Act is concerned not with the proprietory relation to a misbranded or adulterated drug but with its distribution, which can be accomplished by individuals standing in various relations to the corporation. Liability extends to all who have a responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws, unless the enterprise enjoys the immunity of a guaranty. The offense is committed by all who have such a responsible share in the illicit commerce, and hardship in such matters is balanced against the protection of the innocent public who are wholly helpless.

The dissent argues that the criminal sanctions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act do not plainly and unmistakably apply to corporate officers without clear statutory authorization. There is no evidence of the respondent's personal guilt, knowledge of wrongdoing, or active participation in the introduction of adulterated drugs into commerce. Guilt is imputed solely on the basis of his authority and responsibility as a corporate officer. The dissent contends that, in the absence of clear statutory language, it is inconsistent with established canons of criminal law to rest liability on an act in which the accused did not participate and of which he had no personal knowledge. The legislative history of the Act and prior food and drug legislation demonstrates that Congress deliberately omitted clear language that would have imposed liability on corporate officers. The dissent warns of the dangers in attempting to create such liability without express Congressional intent or authorization.

United States v. Dotterweich

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