United States v. Dinitz
424 U.S. 600 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial of a defendant who successfully moves for a mistrial, unless the defendant's motion was necessitated by judicial or prosecutorial conduct that was intended to provoke the mistrial request.
Facts:
- Nathan Dinitz was indicted on federal drug conspiracy and distribution charges.
- Five days before his trial, Dinitz retained Maurice Wagner as his lead defense counsel.
- During his opening statement, Wagner made improper remarks, calling the case 'The Case of the Incredible Witness,' despite the judge's warnings.
- Wagner later attempted to discuss an alleged extortion attempt against Dinitz but could not connect it to any government witness as promised.
- As a result of this repeated misconduct, the trial judge excluded Wagner from the trial and ordered him to leave the courthouse.
- Dinitz informed the court that he wanted Wagner, not his other attorneys, to represent him and felt he needed more time to obtain new counsel.
Procedural Posture:
- A jury was impaneled in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida for Nathan Dinitz's trial.
- After the trial judge expelled Dinitz's lead counsel, the judge presented Dinitz with three procedural alternatives.
- Dinitz, through his remaining counsel, moved for a mistrial, which the trial court granted.
- Before the second trial, Dinitz filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, which the district court denied.
- Dinitz was convicted by a jury in the second trial.
- Dinitz (appellant) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding the retrial violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.
- The Court of Appeals granted a rehearing en banc and, by an 8-7 vote, affirmed the panel's decision to reverse the conviction.
- The United States (petitioner) was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bar the retrial of a defendant whose original trial ended in a mistrial granted at his own request, when that request was prompted by the trial judge's exclusion of his primary defense counsel for misconduct?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stewart
No. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the retrial of a defendant who successfully moves for a mistrial, unless the motion was the product of judicial or prosecutorial bad faith intended to provoke a mistrial request. The 'manifest necessity' standard applies when a mistrial is declared over a defendant's objection, but different considerations apply when the defendant requests it. When a defendant moves for a mistrial, they are exercising control over the proceedings and choosing to forgo their 'valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal' in favor of a new trial. This choice removes the double jeopardy bar unless the judge or prosecutor acted in bad faith to 'goad' the defendant into requesting the mistrial. Here, although the trial judge may have overreacted in expelling counsel, the record does not show his actions were motivated by bad faith or intended to harass or prejudice the respondent.
Concurring - Chief Justice Burger
I concur fully with the majority and write to emphasize a trial judge's duty to control the conduct of counsel. An opening statement is for outlining evidence, not for making unprovable, prejudicial arguments. The defense counsel's conduct was unprofessional and contemptuous in its defiance of the court's orders. The trial judge, far from overreacting, exercised great restraint in not citing the attorney for contempt on the spot.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. The retrial should be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause because the defendant's motion for a mistrial was not truly consensual. The trial judge's error in expelling counsel deprived Dinitz of any real choice, leaving him in an impossible situation. Because the motion was not a voluntary exercise of an option but was instead compelled by judicial error, it should be treated as a mistrial declared without the defendant's consent. Under that standard, there was no 'manifest necessity' for the judge's action, as less drastic alternatives for disciplining the attorney were available. Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause should bar reprosecution.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the exception to the rule that a defendant-requested mistrial permits retrial. It shifts the analysis away from whether the defendant faced a 'Hobson's choice' and toward the subjective intent of the judge or prosecutor. By establishing a high bar—requiring proof of bad-faith conduct intended to 'goad' the defendant into seeking a mistrial—the Court makes it more difficult for defendants to claim double jeopardy protection after their own motion. This precedent reinforces the idea that the Double Jeopardy Clause primarily protects against governmental oppression and harassment, not against all forms of judicial error that may lead a defendant to seek a new trial.
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