United States v. Dillon
76 Fed. R. Serv. 954, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 13142, 532 F.3d 379 (2008)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A government official acts 'under color of law' for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 242 when there is a sufficient nexus between the official's duties and the wrongful conduct. This nexus can be established when the official uses their position to gain access to the victim and then implicitly invokes their governmental authority to facilitate the crime or compel the victim's submission.
Facts:
- Henry Dillon was a part-time Assistant City Attorney (ACA) for New Orleans, prosecuting minor municipal and traffic offenses, and also maintained a private law practice.
- Carolyn Carter first met Dillon when he, as an ACA, helped her resolve some traffic tickets. Later, when her son was arrested on a municipal charge, she sought Dillon's assistance again.
- Dillon instructed Carter to come alone to his private law office to discuss her son's case. Once there, he made a phone call to a judge to arrange for her son's release.
- Immediately after the call, Dillon boasted he could 'make it happen,' prevented Carter from leaving, and when she resisted his advances, he threatened that he knew many police officers, could 'have anybody arrested,' and that she should comply if she wanted her son to remain out of jail. He then raped her.
- Sandy Carraby was arrested on municipal charges and met Dillon at the courthouse, where he was the ACA assigned to her case.
- Dillon questioned Carraby about her case and a prior state marijuana charge, then instructed her to come to his 'other' (private) office later that day for a purported drug test.
- At his private office, Dillon assaulted Carraby. When she resisted, he told her that because she had 'lewd conduct on [her] record,' nobody would believe her over him. He then raped her.
- After raping Carraby, Dillon threatened to 'come after me and my family' if she reported the assault.
Procedural Posture:
- Henry Dillon was charged in a two-count indictment in the United States District Court with depriving individuals of their civil rights under color of law in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242.
- Prior to trial, the district court granted in part the government's motion to admit evidence of other alleged sexual assaults by Dillon under Federal Rule of Evidence 413.
- At trial, Dillon admitted to the sexual encounters but claimed they were consensual.
- A jury found Dillon guilty on both counts.
- Dillon filed motions for judgments of acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case and at the close of all evidence, both of which the district court denied.
- Dillon, as appellant, timely appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a government official act 'under color of law' for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 242 when he uses the authority and opportunities of his official position to meet victims and then implicitly invokes that authority through threats and intimidation to facilitate sexual assaults in a private setting?
Opinions:
Majority - Garwood, Circuit Judge
Yes. A government official acts under color of law when a sufficient nexus exists between the misuse of power and the authority of the official's state position. This nexus was established because Dillon used his official position as an Assistant City Attorney to meet his victims and then invoked his official authority to coerce them into submission and discourage them from reporting the assaults. The court found that an 'air of official authority pervaded the entire incident.' Dillon initially met both Carter and Carraby through his capacity as an ACA, and they sought his help because of that official role. The critical element was Dillon's verbal invocation of his power. With Carter, he threatened he could 'have anybody arrested' after demonstrating his ability to secure her son's release. With Carraby, he used his knowledge of her criminal record—a record he had access to due to his position—to intimidate her by stating no one would believe her. The court concluded that explicitly stating his title was unnecessary, as doing so would 'elevate form over substance,' because the substance of his statements clearly invoked his actual or perceived power as a city prosecutor.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that the 'under color of law' requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 242 is met even when a government official's criminal acts occur in a private setting and involve an implicit, rather than explicit, invocation of authority. The ruling strengthens the 'nexus' test by focusing on the functional reality of how the official's power was perceived and used to facilitate the crime. It establishes a significant precedent that an official cannot escape liability by physically separating their criminal conduct from their official workplace, so long as their authority was instrumental in creating the opportunity for the crime and coercing the victim. This substance-over-form approach broadens the scope of potential liability for officials who abuse their positions for personal, criminal ends.
Unlock the full brief for United States v. Dillon