United States v. Devin Hodge
2005 WL 1501492, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12700, 412 F.3d 479 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
A prosecutor breaches a plea agreement promising no specific sentencing recommendation if their allocution at sentencing implicitly recommends a particular sentence. While package deal plea bargains are constitutionally permissible, courts must be notified of such agreements and conduct plea colloquies with special care to ensure the voluntariness of each defendant’s plea.
Facts:
- In May 1999, a federal grand jury indicted Devin Hodge, Irvine Hodge, and a third defendant for the murder of the owner of the Emerald Lady Jewelry Store and theft of jewelry in St. Thomas.
- Devin Hodge initially pleaded not guilty to both the second and third superseding indictments.
- As early as mid-1999, Devin Hodge initiated discussions with the government about a plea bargain.
- In late April 2000, the government sent Devin Hodge's attorney a draft plea agreement, accompanied by a cover letter stating that the plea offer was a "lock plea," requiring both Devin and Irvine Hodge to accept as a condition of the government’s acceptance.
- Four days later, Devin Hodge pleaded guilty to first-degree murder under a written plea agreement that stipulated the government would "seek dismissal" of remaining counts, "recommend that [Devin] receive credit for acceptance of responsibility," and "make no specific sentencing recommendation other than to request that the sentence be within the guideline range."
- The written plea agreement for Devin Hodge did not mention that his plea was a "lock plea" or otherwise conditioned upon Irvine Hodge's identical plea.
- Later in April 2000, the District Court held a joint change-of-plea hearing for Devin and Irvine Hodge, where their attorneys indicated the pleas were identical and agreed to a "dual inquiry."
- At Devin Hodge's sentencing in March 2002, the government attorney made statements questioning whether the community should "wonder, once his sentence is completed and he's released back into the community, whether it's a genuine change or not," and urged the Court to "fashion a sentence that is fair and just to the victims in this case," which included the wife of the deceased who had asked for the "full penalty of the law."
Procedural Posture:
- In May 1999, a federal grand jury indicted Devin Hodge, Irvine Hodge, and a third defendant for murder and theft related to the Emerald Lady Jewelry Store.
- Devin Hodge pleaded not guilty to the Second Superseding Indictment.
- In March 2000, Devin Hodge pleaded not guilty to a Third Superseding Indictment.
- In April 2000, Devin Hodge pleaded guilty to first-degree murder under a plea agreement.
- Later in April 2000, the District Court of the Virgin Islands held a joint change-of-plea hearing for Devin Hodge and Irvine Hodge, where both pleaded guilty to first-degree murder.
- In March 2002, the District Court of the Virgin Islands sentenced Devin Hodge and Irvine Hodge to life in prison.
- Devin Hodge filed a notice of appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (No. 02-1718), arguing that the District Court ignored law on "exceptional post-offense rehabilitation."
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Issue:
1. Did the government breach its plea agreement with Devin Hodge by implicitly recommending a specific sentence during the sentencing hearing, despite promising to make no specific sentencing recommendation? 2. Did the District Court commit plain error by failing to conduct Devin Hodge's plea colloquy with special care, given that his guilty plea was part of an undisclosed package deal contingent on his brother Irvine Hodge's identical plea?
Opinions:
Majority - SMITH, Circuit Judge
Yes, the government breached its plea agreement with Devin Hodge by implicitly recommending a life sentence during the sentencing hearing. The prosecutor's statements, such as asking whether the community should 'wonder' about Devin's release and urging a 'fair and just' sentence for the victims who had requested the 'full penalty of the law,' plainly implied a specific, harsh sentence, effectively a life sentence 'in all but name.' This conduct violated the government's explicit promise in the plea agreement to 'make no specific sentencing recommendation other than to request that the sentence be within the guideline range.' Citing Santobello v. New York and United States v. Queensborough, the court affirmed that plea agreements are contracts requiring strict adherence, and the government's conduct must align with the parties’ reasonable understanding of the agreement, not merely a 'rigidly literal' interpretation as established in United States v. Crusco and United States v. Moscahlaidis. No, the District Court did not plainly err in conducting Devin Hodge's plea colloquy. The court found that at the time of the colloquy in 2000, there was no 'clear and obvious' precedent in the Third Circuit requiring disclosure of package deals or mandating special care during Rule 11 colloquies for such arrangements. Although other Circuits had such requirements, this Circuit had only discussed package deals in dicta, stating they were permissible if voluntary (United States v. Seligsohn). Therefore, under the plain error standard from United States v. Vonn, the District Court's failure to apply special care was not an obvious error at the time. However, the court established new requirements for future package deal pleas in this Circuit. It held that while constitutionally permissible, such deals pose special coercion risks. Therefore, going forward, the parties must notify the district court that a package deal exists and state its specific terms on the record. Furthermore, the district court must exercise 'special care' during the Rule 11 colloquy to ensure that each defendant's plea is voluntary, which includes closely questioning counsel about the deal's precise terms, who proposed it, defense counsel's involvement, and the defendant's expected benefit, while remaining particularly attentive to any expressions of reluctance from the defendant.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the scope of prosecutorial obligations in plea agreements, particularly concerning sentencing recommendations. It reinforces that the government's promises are to be interpreted not just literally but also based on the parties' reasonable understanding, broadening the definition of a breach to include implicit recommendations. Crucially, the case establishes a mandatory procedural framework for 'package deal' plea bargains in the Third Circuit, requiring explicit disclosure to the court and heightened judicial scrutiny during plea colloquies. This will likely lead to more transparent plea negotiations and more robust judicial oversight, aiming to better protect defendants' constitutional right to a voluntary plea in multi-defendant scenarios, thereby influencing how future plea agreements are structured and reviewed.
