UNITED STATES of America v. Francis J. DE SISTO
329 F.2d 929 (1964)
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Rule of Law:
A witness’s prior statements of identification, made under oath at a former trial or before a grand jury, are admissible as substantive evidence of guilt and are not limited to impeachment purposes, even if the witness subsequently expresses doubt about the identification.
Facts:
- On September 1, 1959, a truck driver named Fine had his truck, loaded with imported silk goods, hijacked in Brooklyn minutes after leaving a pier.
- The hijacker blocked Fine's truck, climbed onto the running board, and threatened Fine from about 18 inches away before ordering him to pull over.
- Fine was then forced into a car, blindfolded with taped glasses, and driven to a remote area where he was left handcuffed to a tree.
- Later that same afternoon, De Sisto telephoned Clesto Auto Service to rent a large truck.
- De Sisto went to the service garage, signed a rental contract for a Clesto truck, paid a $50 deposit, and drove it away.
- De Sisto later made phone calls to delay the truck's return, falsely claiming it was loaded with furniture that could not be moved.
- On September 4, the hijacked truck was found empty and abandoned.
- On September 6, authorities found the truck De Sisto had rented in a Brooklyn garage, containing the 31 cartons of stolen silk goods and nothing else.
Procedural Posture:
- De Sisto was initially convicted in a federal trial court for hijacking a truck in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
- De Sisto, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which reversed his conviction due to trial errors.
- A new trial was held in the same federal trial court before a different judge and a jury.
- The jury at the second trial again found De Sisto guilty.
- De Sisto, as appellant, appealed his second conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the orthodox rule limiting the use of a witness's prior inconsistent statements solely for impeachment purposes apply to prior sworn identification testimony when the witness expresses doubt about that identification at a subsequent trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Friendly, Circuit Judge
No. The orthodox rule limiting prior inconsistent statements to impeachment does not apply to prior sworn identification testimony; such testimony may be used as substantive evidence of guilt. The court reasoned that the traditional rule against using prior statements as substantive evidence is an anachronism that impedes the pursuit of truth. The Supreme Court's concern in Bridges v. Wixon against convictions based on unsworn testimony is not applicable here, as Fine's prior identifications were made under oath (at a grand jury and a former trial) or adopted under oath. These prior statements possess significant safeguards of reliability, including the oath, the threat of perjury, and, in the case of former trial testimony, prior cross-examination. Common sense dictates that an identification made closer in time to the event is often more reliable than a later recantation. Therefore, it is illogical to ask a jury to perform the 'mental gymnastics' of considering the prior identification only for its bearing on credibility and not as affirmative proof of the defendant's identity.
Analysis:
This decision carves out a significant and influential exception to the traditional common law rule that treated prior inconsistent statements as hearsay, admissible only for impeachment. By allowing prior sworn identifications to be used as substantive evidence, the court prioritized reliability and common sense over rigid formalism. This ruling presaged and influenced the later adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), which formally exempts prior statements of identification from the rule against hearsay. The case strengthens the prosecution's ability to secure a conviction when a key identification witness recants or becomes uncertain on the stand, allowing the jury to credit the earlier, often more reliable, identification.
