United States v. Deshawn Dozier
848 F.3d 180, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1607, 2017 WL 395098 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
When determining if a conviction under a state's general attempt statute qualifies as a predicate offense for a sentencing enhancement, a court must conduct a two-part categorical analysis. The court must first determine if the state's definition of 'attempt' matches the generic federal definition, and second, determine if the underlying substantive offense the defendant attempted to commit categorically matches the generic predicate offense.
Facts:
- Deshawn Dozier distributed a quantity of cocaine base, a federal crime.
- Dozier had previously been convicted in West Virginia for 'attempt to distribute a controlled substance'.
- The West Virginia law under which Dozier was convicted is a general attempt statute, W. Va. Code § 61-11-8, which criminalizes the attempt to commit any offense, rather than a specific crime.
- The United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) provide for a significantly longer prison sentence for defendants classified as a 'career offender'.
- To be a 'career offender,' a defendant must have at least two prior felony convictions for either a 'crime of violence' or a 'controlled substance offense'.
Procedural Posture:
- Deshawn Dozier was charged in federal district court with distribution of cocaine base.
- Dozier pled guilty to the charge.
- A Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended designating Dozier a 'career offender' based on two prior state convictions, including one for attempt to distribute a controlled substance.
- Dozier objected to the PSR's recommendation, arguing his West Virginia attempt conviction did not qualify as a 'controlled substance offense' under the Sentencing Guidelines.
- The district court overruled Dozier's objection, applied the modified categorical approach to find the conviction qualified, and sentenced Dozier as a career offender to 151 months in prison.
- Dozier (appellant) appealed his sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, with the United States as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a prior state conviction under a general attempt statute qualify as a 'controlled substance offense' for the purposes of the career offender sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2?
Opinions:
Majority - Davis, Senior Circuit Judge
Yes, a prior state conviction under a general attempt statute can qualify as a 'controlled substance offense' if it passes a specific two-part analysis. The district court erred in its methodology by applying the modified categorical approach to an indivisible general attempt statute. The correct procedure involves a two-part categorical analysis. First, the court must compare the elements of the state's attempt crime with the generic federal definition of attempt. Here, West Virginia's definition—requiring specific intent and an overt act—substantively corresponds to the generic definition of requiring culpable intent and a substantial step. Second, the court must compare the elements of the underlying substantive offense (the crime attempted) to the generic federal predicate offense. The underlying West Virginia drug statute is divisible, as it prescribes different punishments based on drug schedules. The modified categorical approach is therefore appropriate at this second step. Examination of Shepard documents reveals Dozier attempted to distribute cocaine, a Schedule II drug, which is a felony under the state statute and qualifies as a generic controlled substance offense. Because both parts of the analysis are satisfied, the conviction qualifies, and the career offender enhancement was proper.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a crucial framework for analyzing prior convictions under general state attempt statutes within the Fourth Circuit. It reinforces the Supreme Court's mandate in cases like Mathis and Descamps to strictly limit the modified categorical approach to divisible statutes. By creating a specific two-step process—analyzing the attempt statute first, then the underlying offense statute—the court prevents the improper application of the modified approach to indivisible general statutes while still allowing a fact-sensitive inquiry where appropriate (i.e., when the underlying statute is itself divisible). This provides clear guidance for lower courts and ensures a more consistent application of the career offender guideline to these common but complex prior convictions.
