United States v. Deegan
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 10553, 2010 WL 2035723, 605 F.3d 625 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
A sentence that falls within a properly calculated advisory Sentencing Guidelines range is not substantively unreasonable, even for an atypical crime, if the district court considered the statutory sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). An appellate court must review such a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.
Facts:
- In October 1998, Dana Deegan, a member of the Three Affiliated Tribes, secretly gave birth to a live baby boy in her home on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.
- At the time, Deegan had three other young children, was unemployed, and her common-law husband was addicted to drugs and abusive.
- Approximately two hours after the birth, Deegan fed and cleaned the baby, placed him in a basket, and intentionally left him alone in the house without care, food, or water.
- Deegan did not return to her home for approximately two weeks, at which point she discovered the baby had died.
- She placed the baby's remains in a suitcase and left it in a rural ditch near her residence.
- The baby's remains were found in 1999, but Deegan was not identified as the mother until a DNA match in February 2007.
- When first interviewed by the FBI, Deegan falsely claimed the baby was stillborn but later admitted the baby was born alive and she intentionally abandoned him, knowing he would die, because she felt unable to care for a fourth child.
Procedural Posture:
- A federal grand jury indicted Dana Deegan for first-degree murder and making false statements to the FBI.
- Deegan entered into a plea agreement, agreeing to plead guilty to a single count of second-degree murder.
- The government filed an information charging Deegan with second-degree murder in the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota.
- Deegan pled guilty to second-degree murder.
- The Presentence Investigation Report recommended an advisory guideline range of 121 to 151 months' imprisonment.
- At the sentencing hearing, Deegan argued for a below-guideline sentence based on her history of abuse and expert testimony on the phenomenon of neonaticide.
- The district court sentenced Deegan to 121 months' imprisonment, the bottom of the advisory range.
- Deegan, the appellant, appealed her sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, arguing it was unreasonable.
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Issue:
Is a sentence at the bottom of the advisory guideline range for second-degree murder substantively unreasonable when the defendant's conduct, neonaticide, is an atypical offense driven by significant mitigating psychological and personal circumstances?
Opinions:
Majority - Colloton, Circuit Judge
No, the sentence is not substantively unreasonable. A sentence at the bottom of the advisory guideline range is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness, and the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion. The court correctly calculated the guideline range, recognized its discretion to vary from it, considered all the § 3553(a) factors, and adequately explained its decision. While Deegan presented significant mitigating evidence regarding her history of abuse and the unique circumstances of neonaticide, the district court was entitled to weigh those factors against the seriousness of the offense—the murder of a helpless infant—and conclude that a 121-month sentence was necessary to provide just punishment and promote respect for the law. The court's decision to not grant further leniency was a permissible choice within its broad sentencing discretion.
Dissenting - Bright, Circuit Judge
Yes, the sentence is substantively unreasonable. The district court committed gross procedural and substantive error by mechanically applying a guideline sentence to a crime, neonaticide, that falls completely outside the 'heartland' of typical second-degree murder cases contemplated by the Sentencing Commission. The court incorrectly presumed the guideline range was reasonable for 'this type of crime' when no federal data supports this, and it failed to conduct the required individualized assessment under the § 3553(a) factors. Given Deegan's history of horrific abuse, her psychological state, the low risk of recidivism, and the gross disparity with sentences for similar crimes in state court, the 121-month sentence is excessive, unjust, and not 'sufficient, but not greater than necessary' to achieve the goals of sentencing.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard for appellate review of sentences established in Gall v. United States. It demonstrates that even in cases with highly compelling and unusual mitigating facts that place the crime outside the 'heartland' of the applicable guideline, a sentence within the advisory range will likely be upheld as long as the district court does not commit significant procedural error. The case solidifies that the § 3553(a)(6) factor regarding sentencing disparities refers only to unwarranted disparities among federal defendants, not between federal and state defendants. This creates a high bar for defendants seeking to overturn a within-guidelines sentence on substantive unreasonableness grounds.
