United States v. Deborah Walton and Kenneth Marsalis
55 Fed. R. Serv. 192, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 13690, 217 F.3d 443 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA), while a court must order restitution for the full amount of a victim's loss, it retains the discretion to either impose joint and several liability or apportion liability among multiple defendants based on their respective contributions to the loss and individual economic circumstances.
Facts:
- Deborah Walton, Kenneth Marsalis, and Larita Golliday were all former employees of Wells Fargo, the company responsible for servicing the Citibank ATM that was targeted.
- On June 7, 1996, the three individuals drove in separate cars to a Citibank branch in Chicago to execute a planned theft from the drive-up ATM.
- According to their plan, Golliday entered the bank and distracted the security guard by feigning trouble with an interior ATM.
- Walton acted as a lookout, parking her car nearby to flash her headlights as a warning if any problems arose.
- While the guard was distracted and Walton stood watch, Marsalis accessed the external drive-up ATM without force and stole approximately $90,500.
- The lack of forcible entry into the machine led investigators to believe it was an 'inside job'.
- After being identified from surveillance video, Golliday confessed to the FBI, fully implicating Marsalis and Walton and detailing their specific roles in planning and executing the theft.
Procedural Posture:
- Deborah Walton and Kenneth Marsalis were charged in a two-count indictment in federal district court for conspiracy to commit theft and theft from a bank.
- A jury in the U.S. District Court convicted both Walton and Marsalis on both counts.
- The defendants' separate motions for a new trial were denied by the district court.
- The court sentenced Marsalis to twenty-seven months' imprisonment and Walton to ten months' imprisonment.
- The court also ordered Walton, Marsalis, and a third co-conspirator to be jointly and severally liable for restitution in the amount of $90,500.
- Marsalis appealed his conviction and sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, challenging the court's ruling on a peremptory strike, an evidentiary exclusion, and the denial of his motion for a new trial.
- Walton appealed her sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, solely challenging the court's order making her jointly and severally liable for the full restitution amount.
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Issue:
Does the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h), require a sentencing court to impose joint and several liability for the full amount of restitution on all co-defendants, or does it permit the court to apportion liability based on individual factors such as contribution to the loss and economic circumstances?
Opinions:
Majority - Coffey, Circuit Judge.
No. The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) does not require a court to impose joint and several liability for the full amount of restitution; rather, it provides the sentencing court with discretion to apportion liability among co-defendants. The court reversed the restitution order because the trial judge mistakenly believed he was required to impose joint and several liability for the full amount on all defendants. The MVRA, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h), expressly states that a court may make each defendant liable in full or may 'apportion liability among the defendants to reflect the level of contribution to the victim’s loss and economic circumstances of each defendant.' Because the trial record indicated the judge was unaware of this discretion, and in fact was incorrectly advised by both prosecution and defense counsel that full liability was mandatory, the restitution portion of Walton's sentence was based on a legal error. The case was remanded for the sentencing court to exercise its discretion and provide specific findings for its restitution decision, particularly since it had already acknowledged Walton's financial inability to pay a fine. The court affirmed all other aspects of the convictions and sentences, finding no clear error in the trial court's rejection of Marsalis's Batson challenge, no abuse of discretion in excluding evidence of a prior unsolved theft, and no prejudicial Brady violation from the delayed disclosure of phone records.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies for the Seventh Circuit that the 'mandatory' nature of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act applies to the court's duty to order full restitution to the victim, not to the method of assigning liability among co-defendants. It underscores the importance of a sentencing court understanding and exercising its statutory discretion to apportion restitution, creating a crucial distinction between the 'if' of restitution (which is required) and the 'how' (which is discretionary). The ruling serves as a strong reminder for both judges and attorneys to be precise about the law during sentencing and requires courts to create a clear record explaining their rationale for either apportioning or not apportioning restitution, especially when a defendant's economic status is at issue.
