United States v. Deaton
209 F.3d 331 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
Sidecasting excavated material from a jurisdictional wetland back into that same wetland constitutes the discharge of a pollutant under the Clean Water Act, requiring a permit.
Facts:
- In November 1988, James Deaton signed a contract to purchase a twelve-acre parcel of land in Wicomico County, Maryland, conditioned on its suitability for a residential subdivision.
- In April 1989, the Wicomico County Health Department denied Deaton's sewage disposal permit application due to unacceptably high groundwater elevations, noting the majority of the parcel was very poorly drained.
- After the permit denial in late April 1989, Deaton contacted the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service (SCS), where Glen Richardson allegedly suggested digging a ditch to address the wetness.
- James and Rebecca Deaton proceeded with the land purchase, with title transferring to them in June 1989.
- Before any work began, Michael Sigrist, District Conservationist at the SCS, inspected the property with Deaton, observed hydric soils and nontidal wetlands, and advised Deaton that a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) would be required for any ditching.
- Deaton disregarded Sigrist's advice and hired a contractor who, using heavy equipment, dug a 1,240-foot drainage ditch across the property, including areas Sigrist identified as wetlands, piling the excavated dirt on either side of the ditch (sidecasting).
- Water from the property flowed into a culvert connected to Perdue Creek, which is a tributary of the Chesapeake Bay.
Procedural Posture:
- In July 1995, the United States filed a civil complaint in district court against James and Rebecca Deaton, alleging they violated the Clean Water Act by discharging fill material (excavated dirt) into a regulated wetland.
- The government moved for partial summary judgment, seeking rulings that jurisdictional wetlands existed on the property, the Deatons had violated the CWA, and they were liable for restoration and civil penalties.
- The Deatons cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing the affected areas were not jurisdictional wetlands, the property was not subject to the CWA, and sidecasting did not require a permit.
- On September 22, 1997, the district court granted partial summary judgment to the government, holding that wetlands on the property were subject to the CWA and that sidecasting excavated material into those wetlands constituted a discharge of a pollutant under the Act, denying the Deatons' motion.
- After the Fourth Circuit decided United States v. Wilson in December 1997, the district court reconsidered its prior ruling on the sidecasting issue.
- On June 23, 1998, the district court vacated its prior determination that sidecasting was a discharge of a pollutant and subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the Deatons.
- The government appealed the district court's June 23, 1998, judgment to the Fourth Circuit.
- The Deatons filed a cross-appeal, challenging the district court's September 22, 1997, rulings that the Corps properly applied its criteria for determining wetlands and that any wetlands on their property were subject to the Clean Water Act.
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Issue:
Does the excavation of material from a wetland and its redeposit into that same wetland (sidecasting) constitute the "discharge of a pollutant" as defined by the Clean Water Act, thereby requiring a permit?
Opinions:
Majority - Michael, Circuit Judge
Yes, sidecasting in a jurisdictional wetland constitutes the discharge of a pollutant under the Clean Water Act. The court reasoned that the Clean Water Act prohibits the unpermitted "discharge of any pollutant" into "navigable waters," and defines "discharge of a pollutant" as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source." The Act specifically includes "dredged spoil" as a pollutant. The court held that when earth and vegetable matter are excavated from a wetland, they transform into "dredged spoil," which is a statutory pollutant. The subsequent redeposit of this dredged spoil into the same wetland constitutes an "addition" of a pollutant, because a type of material (dredged spoil) that was not previously present in that form has now been introduced. The court emphasized that the statute prohibits the addition of a pollutant, not merely the addition of new material. The court further supported its interpretation by noting that Congress classified dredged spoil as a pollutant due to its potential to harm the environment by releasing trapped pollutants, impairing wetland filtration, and increasing suspended sediment, effects that occur regardless of whether the material originated from the same wetland. This understanding of "addition" aligns with interpretations from other circuits like the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in cases such as Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, Ryba-chek v. EPA, and United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the scope of the Clean Water Act (CWA) by firmly establishing that sidecasting in wetlands is a regulated activity. By focusing on the transformation of native material into a statutory pollutant ('dredged spoil') rather than requiring an introduction of new material, the court expanded the interpretation of 'discharge' and 'addition.' This ruling strengthens the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' ability to regulate activities that alter wetlands, even when the material originates from the site itself, and aligns the Fourth Circuit with the broader interpretations adopted by other circuits, thus enhancing the CWA's effectiveness in protecting wetland ecosystems.
