United States v. Davis
2019 U.S. LEXIS 4210, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L. Ed. 2d 757 (2019)
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Rule of Law:
A federal criminal statute's residual clause defining a 'crime of violence' is unconstitutionally vague if it requires courts to imagine an 'ordinary case' of a crime to determine if it involves a substantial risk of physical force, rather than assessing the defendant's actual conduct.
Facts:
- Maurice Davis and Andre Glover committed a series of armed robberies at gas stations in Texas.
- During the robberies, they brandished a short-barreled shotgun.
- The men were charged with Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery.
- Their actions in conspiring to commit the robberies formed the basis for an additional criminal charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
Procedural Posture:
- Maurice Davis and Andre Glover were charged in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas with multiple counts of Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
- A jury convicted the defendants, and the district court imposed sentences of over 50 years for Davis and over 41 years for Glover, including mandatory minimums for the § 924(c) convictions.
- The defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that § 924(c)'s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague.
- The Fifth Circuit initially affirmed the convictions, rejecting the vagueness challenge.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Fifth Circuit's judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Sessions v. Dimaya.
- On remand, the Fifth Circuit reversed its prior decision, held § 924(c)(3)(B) to be unconstitutionally vague, and vacated the defendants' convictions and sentences on the § 924(c) count predicated on conspiracy.
- The United States petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Fifth Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Does the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), which defines a 'crime of violence,' violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it is unconstitutionally vague?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Gorsuch
Yes, the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) violates the Due Process Clause because it is unconstitutionally vague. The statute's language, specifically phrases like 'offense' and 'by its nature,' compels a 'categorical approach' which requires judges to assess the risk posed by an imagined 'ordinary case' of a crime. This approach, established in precedents like Johnson v. United States and Sessions v. Dimaya, creates intolerable uncertainty and unpredictability, as it is impossible to determine what an 'ordinary case' of a crime like conspiracy entails. The government's proposed 'case-specific' reading is contrary to the statute's text, context, and history, and adopting it would amount to judicial rewriting of the law, violating separation of powers. Furthermore, the constitutional avoidance canon cannot be used to expand the reach of a criminal statute, which the government's proposed reading would do.
Dissenting - Justice Kavanaugh
No, the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) does not violate the Due Process Clause. The majority mistakenly extends the logic of Johnson and Dimaya, which dealt with prior convictions, to a statute concerning a defendant's current conduct. Unlike those cases, a 'case-specific' approach here would not create practical or Sixth Amendment problems because a jury can assess the defendant's real-world actions. The statutory text is best read to require this case-specific approach, consistent with hundreds of other constitutional risk-based criminal statutes. Even if the text were ambiguous, the canon of constitutional avoidance requires the Court to adopt the constitutional, case-specific reading rather than striking down a 33-year-old law that is critical for prosecuting violent gun crime.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the Court's intolerance for vague residual clauses in federal criminal statutes, extending the reasoning of Johnson and Dimaya to another key provision, § 924(c). It firmly rejects the government's attempt to save the statute by proposing a 'case-specific' interpretation, reinforcing the separation of powers by refusing to judicially rewrite the law. The ruling forces Congress to legislate with greater precision when defining predicate offenses for sentencing enhancements, likely leading to statutes that either enumerate specific crimes or define 'crime of violence' based on an offense's elements rather than speculative risks.
