United States v. David M. Sahakian
453 F.3d 905, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 17373, 2006 WL 1896399 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
To successfully assert the defense of necessity for possessing a weapon in prison, an inmate must demonstrate they faced an imminent, specific threat of serious bodily injury or death and had no reasonable legal alternatives available, as a generalized fear of future harm in a violent prison environment is insufficient.
Facts:
- David Sahakian was an inmate at the United States Penitentiary at Marion, a maximum-security prison with a documented history of violence.
- Sahakian was the reputed leader of the 'Aryan Brotherhood' prison gang, which had conflicts with other gangs, including the 'DC Blacks'.
- On May 18, 1999, an inmate named Terry Lamar Walker was murdered by members of a gang associated with the Aryan Brotherhood.
- Following the murder, an anonymous inmate informant told officials that Sahakian possessed a 'shank' (a prison-made knife), which he concealed in his rectal cavity.
- Based on this tip, prison officials conducted a search and escorted Sahakian for an x-ray examination.
- During the search, Sahakian admitted to possessing the shank and, after fifteen minutes, removed a four and one-half inch sharpened piece of metal from his body.
- Sahakian claimed he carried the weapon because he feared for his life due to rumors that the 'DC Blacks' gang had put a 'price on his head'.
Procedural Posture:
- David Sahakian was charged in a fourth superceding indictment in the United States District Court with first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and possession of a weapon in prison.
- Prior to trial, the government filed a motion in limine to preclude Sahakian from presenting the defense of necessity.
- The district court (the trial court) granted the government's motion.
- Following a jury trial, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the murder and conspiracy charges, and the court declared a mistrial on those counts.
- The jury returned a guilty verdict against Sahakian on the charge of possession of a weapon in prison.
- The district court sentenced Sahakian to sixty months of imprisonment for the conviction.
- Sahakian appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing the trial court erred by preventing him from presenting his necessity defense.
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Issue:
Does a prisoner's generalized fear of future harm, based on rumors of a 'price on his head' in a violent prison, constitute an 'imminent threat' sufficient to justify the defense of necessity for possessing a weapon, when the prisoner has not pursued available legal alternatives?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Coffey
No. A prisoner's generalized fear of future harm does not constitute an imminent threat required for a necessity defense, especially when available legal alternatives have not been exhausted. A defendant must establish two elements to invoke the defense of necessity: (1) an imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death, and (2) the absence of reasonable legal alternatives to avoid that threat. Citing its precedent in United States v. Tokash, the court construed 'imminent' narrowly in the prison context, requiring more than a 'generalized fear of attack by some unknown or unspecified assailant at some unknown time in the future.' Sahakian's claim of a 'contract' on his life represented a threat of future violence, not an immediate one, as he could not identify a specific assailant or the source of the threat. Furthermore, the court found Sahakian failed to exhaust reasonable legal alternatives, such as informing prison guards or requesting protective custody. The court reasoned that allowing inmates to arm themselves based on generalized fears would make prisons impossible to regulate and would undermine the authority of prison administration.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the extremely high bar for an inmate seeking to use the necessity defense against a charge of possessing a weapon in prison. By narrowly defining 'imminent threat,' the court reinforces that the defense is available only in the most extraordinary and immediate circumstances, not as a remedy for the general dangers of prison life. The ruling strongly affirms judicial deference to the executive and legislative branches in matters of prison security and administration. This precedent makes it exceptionally difficult for future defendants in similar situations to present a necessity defense to a jury, effectively requiring them to exhaust all administrative remedies, even if they believe them to be futile, before resorting to illegal self-help.
