United States v. Daniel Kuualoha Aukai
440 F.3d 1168, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 6614 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
Once a prospective airline passenger submits to an initial security screening that is inherently 'inconclusive' (such as a magnetometer scan), they have impliedly consented to a secondary screening triggered by objective criteria and cannot revoke that consent by electing not to fly.
Facts:
- Daniel Kuualoha Aukai arrived at Honolulu International Airport to take a Hawaiian Airlines flight.
- At the ticket counter, Aukai did not produce a government-issued picture identification.
- The ticket agent wrote the phrase “No ID” on Aukai’s boarding pass.
- Aukai proceeded to the security checkpoint and voluntarily walked through a metal detector without setting off an alarm.
- Due to the “No ID” notation, a TSA officer directed Aukai to a roped-off area for a mandatory secondary screening.
- At some point before the secondary screening was complete, Aukai stated that he wanted to leave the airport.
- A TSA officer proceeded with the secondary screening, using a handheld wand that alarmed over Aukai’s pants pocket.
- After Aukai repeatedly claimed his pocket was empty, he eventually removed an object which was found to be a glass pipe used for methamphetamine.
Procedural Posture:
- Aukai was indicted in the U.S. District Court for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute.
- Aukai filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during the airport search, arguing it violated the Fourth Amendment.
- The district court, a trial-level court, denied Aukai's motion to suppress.
- Aukai then entered a conditional guilty plea, which preserved his right to appeal the court's denial of his suppression motion.
- Aukai (appellant) timely appealed the district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with the United States as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a prospective airline passenger who has submitted to an initial, inconclusive airport security screening retain a Fourth Amendment right to revoke consent to a mandatory secondary screening by electing not to fly?
Opinions:
Majority - Bea
No. A prospective airline passenger does not retain the right to revoke consent once they have submitted to an inconclusive initial screening. The court held that airport security screenings are administrative searches that must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Relying on precedent from Torbet v. United Airlines, the court determined that an initial screening, like passing through a magnetometer, is inherently 'inconclusive' because it cannot rule out every possibility of dangerous contents, especially non-metallic items. Because the initial screening is inconclusive, the passenger's voluntary submission to it constitutes irrevocable implied consent to a subsequent, secondary screening, provided the secondary screening is triggered by an objective criterion—in this case, the lack of identification. Allowing a passenger to withdraw at this stage would undermine the deterrent purpose of security screenings by providing a 'safe exit' for individuals who fear detection.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies and narrows the 'right to leave' principle originally established in United States v. Davis. It extends the 'inconclusive screening' rationale from Torbet (which involved random baggage searches) to apply to personal searches of passengers triggered by other objective criteria like the failure to present identification. The ruling solidifies the legal doctrine that once a passenger enters the security screening process, their consent to a complete screening becomes irrevocable, thereby strengthening the authority of the TSA to conduct secondary searches. Future legal challenges will likely focus on what constitutes an 'objective criterion' for a secondary search or whether a particular search is 'more extensive nor intensive than necessary,' rather than on the right to revoke consent.
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