United States v. Daniel Joseph Maravilla, United States v. Rafael Jesus Dominguez
907 F.2d 216, 30 Fed. R. Serv. 600, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 11363 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
A foreign citizen who enters the United States for only a few hours with no intention of staying overnight does not qualify as an "inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District" under the federal criminal civil rights statute, 18 U.S.C. § 242. Therefore, individuals cannot be prosecuted under this specific statute for depriving such a visitor of their civil rights.
Facts:
- Yamil Mitri Lajam, a money courier and citizen of the Dominican Republic, arrived at Puerto Rico’s airport on September 10, 1982.
- Lajam was carrying approximately $700,000 in cash and checks, which he intended to deposit in a San Juan bank before returning to the Dominican Republic that same afternoon.
- Upon arrival, Lajam was referred for an interview with U.S. Customs officer Rafael Dominguez.
- Dominguez was joined by fellow officer Daniel Maravilla, and they interviewed Lajam together.
- After the interview, Dominguez and Lajam left the customs office together; Maravilla also left the office around the same time.
- Lajam was never seen alive again. His body was found ten days later, having been shot to death, and the money was missing.
- Immediately following Lajam's disappearance, Dominguez and Maravilla, who previously had very little money, began spending large sums of cash and took steps to hide hundreds of thousands of dollars.
- In the week after Lajam disappeared, Dominguez asked a friend to take his gun to a shop to have the barrel replaced.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States government indicted Rafael Dominguez and Daniel Maravilla in federal district court on several charges, including depriving an "inhabitant" of a civil right under 18 U.S.C. § 242.
- A jury in the U.S. District Court (the trial court) found both defendants guilty on all counts.
- The district court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced the defendants.
- Dominguez and Maravilla, as appellants, appealed their convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
- On appeal, the defendants argued, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient and that the victim was not an "inhabitant" within the meaning of § 242.
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Issue:
Does a foreign citizen who enters the United States for only a few hours with the intent to leave the same day qualify as an "inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District" for the purposes of the criminal civil rights statute, 18 U.S.C. § 242?
Opinions:
Majority - Breyer, Circuit Judge
No, a foreign citizen visiting the United States for only a few hours with the intent to leave the same day is not an "inhabitant" under 18 U.S.C. § 242. The court reversed the conviction under § 242, finding that the plain meaning of the word "inhabitant" cannot be distorted to include such a temporary visitor. The court's reasoning relied on several points: 1) Dictionary definitions of "inhabitant" all relate to dwelling, living, or residing in a place, not a brief visit. 2) A survey of the U.S. Code reveals no instance where "inhabitant" is used to describe a temporary visitor; in constitutional and statutory contexts, it implies a more settled presence. 3) Case law, with the arguable exception of United States v. Otherson, supports this narrow reading. The court distinguished Otherson, noting it involved illegal aliens who presumably intended to stay, unlike the victim here who had a clear, documented intent to leave immediately. 4) The legislative history, while showing a broad intent to protect civil rights, does not warrant expanding the scope of a specific word in a criminal statute beyond what its language can bear.
Concurring - Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge
Agrees with the majority opinion that the victim was not an "inhabitant." The author adds that the concept of "habitation" implies a sense of continuum. Just as one does not become an inhabitant of every town a bus passes through, a person does not become an inhabitant of a country by visiting for a few hours.
Dissenting - Torruella, Circuit Judge
A foreign citizen present in the United States, even temporarily, should be considered an "inhabitant" under 18 U.S.C. § 242. The dissent argues that civil rights statutes are meant to be interpreted broadly to fulfill their protective purpose, and the majority's narrow reading thwarts that intent. The dissent contends that legislative history and precedent from the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Otherson support the view that § 242 was intended to protect "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States." It would be anomalous to grant substantive civil rights to all persons (under the civil counterpart, 42 U.S.C. § 1981) but provide criminal enforcement for only a subset. The dissent warns that the majority's decision creates illogical results where an overnight tourist is protected but a daytime visitor is not.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the scope of the federal criminal civil rights statute, 18 U.S.C. § 242, by adopting a strict, textualist interpretation of the term "inhabitant." By distinguishing between temporary visitors and those with some intent to reside, the court creates a limitation on federal jurisdiction to prosecute civil rights violations against certain classes of aliens. The ruling establishes a circuit split with the Ninth Circuit's broader interpretation in United States v. Otherson, highlighting the unresolved tension between the plain text of the statute and its perceived broad protective purpose. Future cases in the First Circuit involving crimes against tourists or other short-term visitors will face a higher bar for prosecution under § 242.
